


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ALBANIA

Alia's Preelection Speech to Tirana Voters

9/P20319A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
30 Mar 91 pp 1-3

[Speech by Ramiz Alia, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party, to Tirana voters in the Palace of Congresses on 29 March]

[Text]

Dear comrades, sisters, and brothers,

I have come to meet and talk with you, not only as a candidate to voters, but as a friend and comrade, as people talk and discuss when they sincerely wish to help each other for the general good of society.

I thank you for the warm reception and the fraternal feelings you have shown for me and our heroic party.

Your proposal that I should represent you in the highest organ of the state in the next legislature is an expression of trust and it is also a great obligation for me.

Two days remain until the elections. It is a time when every citizen must honestly orient his political awareness in order to determine, logically and sincerely, for whom to vote. The fate of Albania, the direction of future events, and the road which the country will follow all depend on the vote of the people.

I am confident that the people will turn the historic test of 31 March into a proof of their political maturity. Their vote will be for the Workers Party because this party took them out of their misery and ignorance, out of exploitation and slavery, and made them master of their fate and of the sovereignty of the country and made them rank among civilized peoples and countries.

The Workers Party is a party which is deeply rooted in the people. Many storms have occurred, many tests have been placed before history, and many political passions and waves have flowed over these ties. But their common struggle and victories, their common history, the joys and the losses, and their common stands and challenges cannot be put aside or undone.

The programs which the political forces taking part in this election campaign have presented are many but, in essence, there are only two choices: social justice and equality or the differentiation and polarization of society; security in life or insecurity; gradual positive change or shocks and destabilization; the strengthening of the freedom and independence of the country or their auctioning off. We believe in the high patriotic awareness and reasoning power of our people in regard to the road which they will choose.

The Albanian Workers Party [PPSH] is the only political force to come to this campaign able to present an accounting for itself, because it does so not for the first time but for the 10th time.

Political parties are bolstered by the programs they put forward, the solutions and alternatives they propose, and the ideals by which they inspire people. However, there are those who think that it is easier to distinguish themselves by amplifying the mistakes and defects of others and denigrating the achievements of the past than by winning people's hearts and minds by democratic means, in a constructive spirit,

We are not afraid of history; we stand with head held high before it. The PPSH considers history an advantage, not an obstacle, in the election race for victory. In this long history, our people have had many opportunities and many trials to confirm their faith in the Party. In the trials to which they have been subjected, the Albanian communists have distinguished themselves with honor before the times and before their people. Although in this history there have been solutions which could have been better, mentioning them with no malevolent intention does not damage in the least the positive image of the PPSH. The PPSH took into its hands the destiny of the people at a time when they were threatened with their obliteration as a nation and it made Albania a modern state, fully accepted in the bosom of the great family of peoples.

The people have faithfully followed our Party as the only liberating force. They have made all the sacrifices required, in the name of a free and independent Albania governed by the common people. The government which emerged from the National Liberation War was the government of the people, a completely democratic government. The feudal monarchy was buried and its place was taken by a republican form of government, on broad social and popular bases.

The Workers Party is the party which prevented the annexation of Albania by Yugoslavia. It is the party of Enver Hoxha who challenged the Soviet imperial appetites in 1960 and got the foreign bases out of the country. It deserves credit for the fact that Albania renounced the Warsaw Pact Treaty as far back as 1968 and did not join any foreign military pacts. No one dares to deny these important things. On the contrary, many people today are obliged to recognize that Albania deserves more acclaim for its heroic stand. Political independence has certainly been one of the best things about Albania and it should be said that this has been a sizeable contribution to the unity of the European peoples. However, this independence has cost us dearly but the cost was worth it.

The socialist style of production and the economic policy which we chose prompted material progress in all parts of the country. Through the work of the people, our homeland has been enriched year after year. The main assets which we currently have in agriculture amount to more than one billion leks—which is equal to the consumption of all the people for six years. In the first year of freedom, the entire country produced about one billion leks of social product while today the economy has an annual production of about 40 billion leks.

We embarked on this road by producing 200,000-300,000 tons of minerals a year while now we produce 10 million tons. On the whole, we have a profitable economy, from the most efficient branches to those which are harder to make profitable, such as heavy industry. In every 100 leks of social product, 20-25 leks are net profit. Even in metallurgy, an area whose efficiency has been questioned recently, despite the lack of a tradition, revenues are greater than expenses.

We started out in our free life with an annual production of 350 kg of food per capita, while today we produce an average of 550-600 kg. Cooperativization saved the villages from hunger and difficulties, and from social conflicts. It integrated the village economy into the large national production system.

Although the 1986-90 period was the period with the lowest rates of development, the overall social product was almost twice as high as it was in the 1971-75 period. According to the last census of the population, one out of every two people is receiving a wage or a pension.

No matter where you look, you can see that the policy of material development which the Workers Party has pursued is economically justified. We have not lost any time and we have not misused any opportunity or source of development. Entitlements paid to the population are equal in value to about three-quarters of the annual general wage fund. The fact that we are the European country with the lowest number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants and the fact that the life expectancy of the Albanian has doubled are not signs of backwardness. Few countries on the continent have made intermediate education compulsory for all.

If, at last, we are embarking, in an irrevocable manner, on the road to democratization, without a lot of pain and suffering, this is a result of our culture and civilization, developed, with special care, by the party.

It is well known that in every history, and especially, in a long history like that of our party, there is room for reassessment. However, there is also in this history a whole series of transformations, actions, and events that can never be revised. Can one be reproached for the expropriation of the property of the landlords, the agrarian reform, the elimination of illiteracy, the establishment of the basis of the people's economy, the large yields in the villages, the total electrification of the country, the founding of the University and the Academy of Sciences, the development of the people's culture, and the standardization of the literary language. Who does not know the value of and who can cast doubts on the usefulness of social security, the many vital services provided free of charge, as well as law and order and security in life?

But let us return to the present. The PPSH is based on the platform of Albanian democracy and is its standard-bearer and protagonist. When, at the PPSH Central Committee plenums, we made the well-known decisions calling for radical changes in legislation, the transition

from an administrative and command economy to a market economy, the establishment of a law-governed state and the separation of state and party activity, and the democratization of the economy and the political system, culture and art and the entire life of the country, not a single opposition party existed.

The Workers Party entered into the period of pluralism aware of the new developments which the country would be encountering and full of confidence in its victory. This confidence has its source in the experience which it has gained in its long activity, the experience which has tempered it so that could bear great burdens. This confidence arises from its ability to go forward in accordance with the ebb and flow of the times and from its assurance of the broad support of the people.

The new Constitution, which stresses a radical democratic reform for all the structures of political power, is the initiative and achievement of the Workers Party. It was the party which introduced a new concept of human rights into the governmental life of the country, raising it to the level of international conventions. Our citizens enjoy the right to freedom of speech and thought, the right to organize and demonstrate, the right to have private property and to travel freely within and outside the country. Illustrative of this new concept is the pardoning, one by one, of several groups of political prisoners, until all those deprived of their freedom for reasons of conscience are finally freed.

The opposition would be pleased if every program, every platform, and every opinion of the Workers Party had been adopted on 8 November 1941 and if its line were unchanging. But when it sees its dialectical spirit, its vitality in really responding, in time, to circumstances and situations, its consistency in the struggle for building a society in which each person would live on the basis of his work and his physical and intellectual abilities, it tries to say that this shows lack of seriousness. In the view of the opposition, any party which said, a few months ago, that it was winter, cannot now say that it is spring! But the Workers Party is not waiting for anyone else to teach it dialectics, seriousness, democracy, or the way to adapt to the new realities.

The Workers Party has always known how to keep in step with the times. Since it undertook the reforms which are now underway, it is aware that it cannot carry them out without first reforming itself. It is to its credit that it feels this need and that it is carrying out reforms in all directions. The current PPSH Program creates possibilities for a complete renewal—political, ideological, and organizational—while, at the same time, preserving its originality and identity. This is great encouragement for us because a party which renews itself and demonstrates that it is innovative and reform-minded in every situation, like the Workers Party, always remains a political force with a great mission.

Lately there has been an emergence of political forces and groupings which have attempted to convince public

opinion that they have a monopoly on democracy. But the current situation does not call for bragging. It calls for work on the part of everyone, without losing a minute, to build democracy. Democracy is and must be the government of the people and no one, besides the people, can claim to have a monopoly over it.

Democracy is built through the constructive cooperation of political forces in the government with those in the opposition. In a democracy, every important decision which is made should be an expression of the sum of the pluralistic political wills and initiatives which exist. Democracy, as a way of thinking and a form of government, has its own means, has the language of dialog and agreement, and has patience and tolerance as a condition. Democracy is not constructed by means of anger and bitterness, or by nihilism or destruction.

Since its liberation, the Workers Party has been the sole political force, but the people have always had political power in their hands. But the party cannot forget or, even less, break with the broad masses who followed it in the struggle which it has waged, in the program and ideals which it upholds. It supports the democratic competition of alternatives and trusts that this competition will propel it to victory. We do not want what does not belong to us and what we do not deserve. The decision of the people, which will be expressed in their vote, is irrevocable for all. The people have painted the time which is coming in beautiful colors. All the country's political forces must be intensively involved in recovering the lost peaceful state, in immediately overcoming economic and moral decline, and establishing, everywhere and above everything, regulations and the law-governed state, in order to advance resolutely toward integration in Europe. However, no one, not even a minority, should be allowed to become disillusioned with democracy. This would have serious consequences. In these difficult times, any disappointment would worsen the situation.

The public confrontation of the political electoral subjects was not the cause of the disillusionment of the people. This disillusionment is the result of sick psychoses, propagandistic aggressiveness, and the destruction of values which have been created. May the events in Tirana, Durrës, Kavajë, and other places be only a bitter memory of the road which we are crossing. Everyone must understand that democracy is the freedom to think what you want but not to do what you want.

We have an opportunity to ensure for the people a fully democratic and modern system of self-government. It would be very dangerous if the economic crisis and the moral decline were to result in another crisis, a crisis of power.

Political parties and associations, various electoral subjects which compete today, are publicly committed to going to vote in a peaceful fashion, submitting themselves cold-bloodedly to the judgement of the people.

The Workers Party, from the beginning and with the institutionalization of political pluralism, has expressed its support for dialog and cooperation with other parties on the basis of its program. It will continue to be guided by this provision. Its program is permeated, from beginning to end, by the idea of national unity.

Albanians have inherited from their elders a sense of understanding and wisdom. They will surely be demonstrating these valuable virtues in the days to come. A pluralistic People's Assembly, a government which emerges from it, and the willingness of all political forces to achieve understanding are basic conditions for the best possible life for the people.

The Workers Party has played a role in all modern-day developments. The opposition has tried to minimize and obscure this role. It wants the people to think that pluralism means a situation of total collapse. However, there can be no pluralism without the Workers Party, without the party which legalizes it and establishes it as a juridical reality. There can be no democracy in situations where there is partial consent and, even less, in situations in which people try to impose their will on everyone else.

People are fully justified in asking: When a party does not miss any chance to dictate its views when it is in the opposition, how would it run the government if it were in power?

I direct myself, on this occasion, to the political awareness of all citizens asking them to judge with a sense of historic responsibility. Everyone must ask himself: Which political force has withstood trials, has not abandoned the people to their fate, and has not left Albania to the mercy of chance? Which political force enjoys the necessary reputation at home and abroad to manage the state and the economy? In which political force can you place your hopes for a speedy emergence from the crisis and for a better material and intellectual life?

To whom other than the Workers Party should be people give their vote if they want a truly free future, without dependence on foreigners.

The parties' election campaigns will end on 31 March. The next day the people's work to implement the ideas and alternatives presented begins.

Today, the people are weighing the programs and alternatives offered and tomorrow, they will weigh the actions. The Workers Party is the best prepared political force for keeping words united with actions. It does not aim to achieve victory in these elections and, then, to shirk its historic responsibility toward the people and the fatherland. It will never betray its voters.

In the current election campaign, the Workers Party has presented a program which has been received with interest by the voters, who have found their fundamental aspirations in it. This program, both at home and abroad,

is thought to be an ambitious alternative which harmonizes the people's desires with the real possibilities of the country. It contains the targets of accelerated development, but they are based on sound economic logic. We have not presented a program just to get votes but a complex of comprehensive measures which ensure a rapid emergence from the critical situation and a people's government which will provide firmer superiority in the social sphere, with justice and equality for all, as well as the achievement of the freedoms and rights of citizens on the basis of well-known international norms.

The economic reform that has already begun will lead to the establishment of wide-ranging democracy in production and the operation and competition of all forms of ownership, trade, and initiatives, combining the operation of objective economic laws and the active role of the state. In our people's economy, each person will be valued according to his work and the contribution he makes. Step by step, we will advance toward shortening the work week. On this very day, the Presidium of the People's Assembly decided that workers will be paid on official holidays.

The implementation of the ideas contained in the PPSH economic program should begin with the immediate stabilization of the situation. Along with the implementation of the new economic mechanism, the most appropriate solutions must be studied and found for transferring production units to a system of complete self-management, for implementing a strict monetary and financial policy, for reorienting some priorities and structures of economic development, for setting prices and wages on the basis of real economic values. All these things will create a new economic climate dominated by initiative, business acumen, and competition.

We look toward the future with optimism. We are a country without debts, with a sound economic structure, with relatively rich natural resources, with enviable geographic conditions, and with possibilities for a high degree of success in foreign investment.

Our program bears in mind the difficult economic times through which we are passing. However, the PPSH takes the view that the difficulties and stagnation being experienced in production can be overcome. How will we emerge from this situation? We are not waiting for salvation from "blank checks" nor from a flood of foreign dollars. We are not nurturing the people on illusions, saying that the world will support us in fine style like landlords. No, brothers and sisters, the only injection which can cure the economy of our country is the work of the people. No one will help us, regardless of what political force leads the country, if we are not all seen to be hard at work. The road to Europe is travelled through work and production. Europe needs business acumen, not tourists.

Our people are right in considering the PPSH program to be the most logical choice for putting the economy in normal working condition and for effecting a positive

change in its processes. This program consists of a new orientation of development priorities, transferring a considerable volume of investments from production to consumption, from heavy industry to light industry and the food industry, from basic resources to items which are bought and sold.

The economic program of the party provides an opportunity for straightening out some processes which life has proven to be unjustified economically. The exaggerations which have been noted in the policy of state monopoly over all economic activities will be corrected by putting three forms of ownership in equal competition—state ownership, group ownership, and private ownership. Some sectors such as the service sector, artisan cooperatives, tourism and others will have a broader base. Trade, especially retail trade, will be developed without any restrictions in regard to ownership, including private ownership. Various types of work arrangements will compete, from cooperative and individual arrangements to contracts, associations, and the daily wage system. This is what we call the new economic climate.

Cooperation with the world in production and trade will be an important factor for the economic recovery of the country. The Workers Party believes that the rapprochement of Albania with Europe should not be carried out by means of the pilgrimage, the exodus of masses of refugees to the West, but by the attraction of foreign capital here. We are for exporting work but not workers. If Europe wants to help Albania, it can give us this aid by investing in our country, of course, with a guarantee of the realism of the investment and of its interests. In its election propaganda, the opposition is trying to frighten the voters, using psychological pressure. Among other things, it says that if the PPSH wins the Western world will not give any aid to Albania. Naturally, such propaganda is aimed at the naive.

The world wants a country to develop normally, with free, secret, and democratic elections. It is up to the voters to decide which party will be in power. If Europe were to follow the wishes of our "democrats," it would betray itself, it would interfere in the internal affairs of others, which it must not do. Discrimination on the part of this or that political force is an antidemocratic concept. It is not a European concept.

Today, the PPSH is the party in power. However, this has not kept Western countries, banks, or companies from establishing economic and financial relations with the Albanian state. Does not the recent cooperation with Italy prove this? There have been discussions with the Italians and an agreement has been reached in principle on a three-year plan for financing various projects in Albania. Do not the economic agreements which have been concluded with France in regard to the Banje hydroelectric power plant or the more than \$30 million credits from Turkey and the more than \$20 million credits from Greece prove this? Does not the cooperation with the IMF prove this?

Our state enterprises have concluded important agreements for the extraction and exploitation of offshore petroleum with West German, American, and Italian companies, which involve very large investments.

We must tell the people that, solely on the basis of agreements signed up to now with foreign companies, the continuation of the investment program at rates which are two to three times more rapid is guaranteed. These investment programs will be implemented gradually in all branches of the economy, from metallurgy, mining, and the machine industry, to textiles, and, finally, to tourism. But political stability is a condition for this. We hope that after 31 March, the political and social and economic life of the country will be back in their ordinary situation.

The Workers Party has pursued a generally correct defense policy. This policy must be judged in close connection with the objective circumstances through which we have passed. The cold war forced us to take steps in this field that may now seem unreasonable. However, it is a different situation today and it is wrong to make judgements without bearing in mind the climate of tension and international confrontations that have existed.

In its program, the Workers Party has not given extensive attention to the military. However, it has had a policy in this area and its positions are clear.

The Army and the internal affairs organs and the justice organs are included and cannot fail to be included in the democratic processes. Their nonaffiliation with any party is part of this framework. This issue will be resolved by law with the approval of the new Constitution which places these organs under the immediate jurisdiction of the higher levels of state power.

The Workers Party considers it a great moral duty to care for military personnel in general, to ensure their legal defense and respect for their image. On its initiative, a study has been made and will soon be implemented for the introduction of military ranks which will serve to strengthen military order and discipline. We do not want the homeland to be defended by a handful of soldiers but by the strength of the united people. We appreciate the climate of reduced tension but we are not going to allow ourselves to be swept away by euphoria.

It is to the Workers Party credit that it is virtually the sole political force in this election campaign, which, despite the serious economic situation, gives special mention to matters related to culture and art in its program. This is a continuation of its early traditions. Our party has waged this struggle alongside the struggle for bread, with the same intensity. An appreciation of culture is the most direct expression of the party's democratic character.

From culture, science, and the intellectuals, our party has always had strong support and legitimate opposition to keep it from erring in words and deeds. It considers

the cultural field as the coauthor of all the achievements of the past and it will respect all the juridical regulations and requirements which are necessary for the varied development of the creative individuality of the human being.

Veterans will be treated with the respect they deserve. They are the pride of the country. The wounds of war and of the constructive actions which they have taken upon their shoulders deserve the highest praise, praise which should never be lacking.

It is known throughout the world that the Workers Party is the initiator of the expansion of our country's ties abroad and of the new view of relations with the world, in general. Through its foreign policy it responds to the new realities and the contemporary spirit of international cooperation and connections.

The process of opening up to and integrating with the world, which began some time ago, was continued clearly and concretely at the beginning of last year, with the decisions of the ninth and tenth plenums of the PPSH Central Committee. Now we can say that this process has been a success.

We have reestablished full relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. The prospects for their development with mutual benefit are promising. Efforts are being made to reestablish diplomatic relations as soon as possible with those few countries with whom, for one reason or another, we have not had diplomatic relations up to now. We hope that the disagreement with England about the Albanian gold, which has divided us up to now, will be resolved with understanding and in accordance with the new world outlook.

As we have said, as a result of the comprehensive efforts which we have made within a short period of time, Albania has met all the conditions, both general and specific, required for full entry into the CSCE. As far as we know, everyone has now agreed to this. This makes us hope that it will not be long before we are admitted. Only the formalities still have to be completed.

Our historic people have a history and culture which is closely linked with Europe. Union with its positive processes is a continuation of these age-old links. It is in the direct interest of our country. Although Europe, as we have said many times, can get along without little Albania, we cannot survive without the outside world.

We are convinced that Europe is looking at Albania in a new light. More and more often, especially since the beginning of the democratizing processes, the people are remembering the debt of the continent to a sovereign state which has been unjustifiably neglected, a state which has contributed very much to European civilization and the European cultural community.

At the present time, there are many people in our country who say, "let's go to Europe," "let's be like Europe," etc. On the basis of these slogans, it seems that

Europe has not moved from its place and nothing has happened in Europe while we Albanians are the only ones who have to move. I do not want to comment on these euphoric slogans which create the impression that union with Europe is an excursion. But the fact is that Europe has changed a lot, both in the West and in the East. It is sufficient to mention the CSCE which is a process resulting from the end of the cold war, the result of Soviet-American relations, transformations in the East, disarmament, and new political concepts which brought a relatively long period of peace on our continent and the result of new developments in international trade and economic cooperation and other areas.

You must not know history or you must be motivated by malevolence if you claim that the current situation in Europe existed earlier but the Workers Party did not notice it or did not understand it.

For a long time, the position which our party took, supporting a policy which was favored neither East nor West, was correct and corresponded to the main interests of the country. Just as the request that Albania join in the European security and cooperation process is also correct for its time. At that time, neutrality ensured the country's full freedom, independence, and sovereignty. Today, these high ideals can be achieved through European security and cooperation. This is true not only for Albania but also for all the countries of the continent.

In this context, the changes and the initiatives carried out by the party cannot be regarded as corrections of errors, although this has been true in some cases. On the whole, they are essential attitudes and adaptations to various international situations and conditions.

Another direction to which we have given much attention from the very beginning is the participation of Albania in the Balkan cooperation process. We have considered this activity as an opportunity to contribute to strengthening peace and friendship with all participants, not only because the Balkans is the region in which we live and will live in the future, but also because its situation is closely linked with and exerts great influence on the situation in Europe and on the efforts to strengthen cooperation on the entire continent.

This attitude and policy toward the Balkans is not just for propaganda purposes or for public opinion. We are motivated by the opinion that a state's policy toward its neighbors is a criterion and measure for evaluating its entire foreign policy.

Today, when the situation in the Balkans has become very delicate and when possible conflicts are ready to break out in Yugoslavia, the course which we have set for participating in cooperation on the peninsula, the concepts and theses which we have defended in connection with these matters, have been clearly proven to be completely right. We have said and we say, once again, that conflicts and disputes among the Balkan countries cannot be resolved by old mind-sets or formulas, but must be approached with a new political will, which is

based on the spirit of European security and cooperation. As time has shown, this is the only democratic alternative for the resolution of the problems which are simmering in the region.

At the present time, the situation in Yugoslavia is very serious and there is a danger that it will become uncontrollable. Such a situation will create concerns and dangers not only for the people of Yugoslavia but also for its neighbors. In Kosovo, in particular, the situation has become dramatic. The Serbian occupation has transformed the Albanians into a people without any rights, into citizens without any defense.

The other Serbian nationalist parties have supported the chauvinistic policy of Milosevic, which aims at turning the Albanians into lackies and slaves. So far, no voice has been heard in Serbia in defense of the Albanians, not only in regard to national and social rights but also in regard to universal human rights. At present, the separation of Serbs and Albanians is complete.

The time has come for all peoples of Yugoslavia—Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins—to state publicly and officially whether they want to join together in a federal, confederative, or common state with Albanians, as independent and equal subjects, or whether they want each one to think for itself.

If, now that they are talking about the physiognomy of the future state of Yugoslavia, the Croats, Slovenes, and others do not seek and do not stress, or rather, do not set forth as a condition, the participation of the Albanians in these talks as equal partners, then cooperation will be difficult. The Albanians cannot be a passive factor in the games and tactics of others, whether they are Yugoslavs or people outside Yugoslavia.

If, once again, they are abandoned to their fate, they will know how to protect their rights and aspirations and how to find the most reasonable ways to achieve them.

In regard to the Albanian state, just as in the past, today and tomorrow, we will support the just demands of our Albanian brothers, without hesitation, to the very end. No slanders or insinuations, no matter where they might come from, will remove us from this stand.

The policy of nonrecognition of national equality in a multinational state, such as Yugoslavia, the policy of enslavement of the Albanians by the Serbs, is anachronistic and has no future. It is conflict with current world trends. The future is with the equality of peoples.

The Workers Party and our state have supported the idea of the codification of the policy of good-neighborliness as an important constant in its attitudes toward the bordering countries. We desire a spirit of good-neighborliness with Yugoslavia and Greece. This spirit is obstructed only when the other party does not desire it.

We welcome the positive steps which have been taken recently in relations with Italy and we have high regard

for the wisdom and support of politicians in that country, in whom we see a sincere interest in our country. We regard these relations from two angles, mutual benefit and a bridge toward Europe. We hope that these dual interests will help us to move further on so that cooperation with Italy will become an example of friendly relations.

Our party will promote an uncomplicated, contemporary foreign Policy. In our foreign policy, it is of major importance that we do not reject the friendship of anyone, whether the hand extended is rich or poor, white, black, or yellow. Although it is an important priority, integration in the European processes will not prevent us from achieving fruitful cooperation with other regions of the world.

Brothers and sisters,

Our people are going and must go to elections with faith in the Albanian Workers Party, because it not only has great political and organizational experience, but it also has creative abilities. It has vitality and is able to respond to the demands of the times, the present and future tasks. This is proven by the fact that our party was the initiator of the process of democratization, the fact that it understood that the future development and progress of the country required radical changes in the political domain and in the area of economic and social relations, including the extension and guaranteeing of human rights. Only a courageous party which has confidence in its links with the people, such as our Workers Party, can make way for pluralism and the creation of different parties.

The people want to travel on the road to democracy, but want to follow this road in peace and quiet, by means of a constructive dialog and far from any activity which might cause disputes and dissension, and even worse, which might result in conflicts and bitterness.

It is to the credit of the Workers Party that, even in delicate and critical moments such as we have experienced recently, it has known how to avoid provocations and, in particular, it has avoided dangerous confrontations, which were and still are one of the aims of all those who wanted to destroy Albania and eliminate its freedom and independence. In the future, too, our party will guarantee peace and order and the normal development of society. It will ensure peaceful democratic development and a peaceful society and the protection and strengthening of national and popular sovereignty. Therefore, we should have confidence in the PPSH, the party which has 50 years of experience and which, during its entire life, has worked and still works for the people and only for their interests.

The Workers Party has never promised the people the heavens and a golden spoon. It has always linked its objectives with the results of the work of the masses. Its program guarantees the rapid stabilization of the situation, the return of people to work, the restoration of the normal production system in the economy. Let the 31

March elections be proof and evidence of the political maturity of the people, a worthy response to the patriotic appeal which the voice of the homeland makes to its conscience.

The elections are two days away. Let us all give our votes to the candidates of the Workers Party, the party which was born in the bosom of the people, the party which was raised by the people, the party which the people will defend.

Once again, I thank you for your confidence.

Long live the Albanian people!
Long live the Albanian Workers Party!

BULGARIA

New Interior Ministry Leadership Presented

AU2804201791 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
24 Apr 91 p 2

[Report by Plamen Milanov]

[Text] The restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is already a fact, Minister Danov announced at a major news conference. He announced the new structure and introduced the new heads of the Interior Ministry departments.

The minister is a politician, who has the total responsibility for the work of the ministry. The chief secretary implements the operational leadership of the Interior Ministry's work. The new structure includes three secretaries, and two have already been appointed. Several national services, which have independent judicial character, have been incorporated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs: the National Security Service; the National Service on the Struggle Against Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terror; the National Police; the Border Troops; the National Fire Protection Service; the Interior Ministry Troops; the Special Unit on the Struggle Against Terror (the "Red Berets"); and the Main Investigation Administration, about which there is a proposal to transfer it to the structure of the Ministry of Justice. This must be adopted by the Grand National Assembly, within the framework of the Bill on the Ministry of Internal affairs, which has been submitted to the Grand National Assembly.

Foreign intelligence is not a part of the Ministry of Internal affairs. It has been subordinated to the president. There are no political police, Minister Danov said. According to him, a large part of the employees of the former State Security were not such wild animals, as certain people now present them. A very big commission now works at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it investigates the activity of the former State Security. The real professionals will be needed in the struggle against organized crime. All modern methods—intelligence, a system of agents, and technical means—will be employed in this struggle.

The minister said that organized forms of neofascist activity still do not exist in Bulgaria.

BSP's Chavdar Kyuranov on Parliament Relations

*AU2504160391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
18 Apr 91 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Chavdar Kyuranov, Bulgarian Socialist Party member of parliament, by Angel Bonev; place and date not given: "An Embrace Between the Major Parliamentary Factions Would Be a Delusion, but a Common Language Could Be Found"]

[Excerpts] [Bonev] Some people are already rejoicing and exclaim: "The opposition is disintegrating!" Others are convinced that the establishment of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]-Center means the opposite. What do you think?

[Kyuranov] In listening to certain SDS members who are interpreting the event, such as Mr. Filip Dimitrov, for example, my impression is that the establishment of the SDS-Center was welcomed with great joy. Certain people in the opposition regard it as an entirely positive fact. Naturally, it is a question of assessment. It is my personal conviction that this fact contributes to the consolidation of the SDS. Nevertheless, one could also assume that the SDS is about to disintegrate, but, if someone should reach the hasty conclusion that the SDS will run for the next elections as an association of parties that are not mutually affiliated, he is greatly mistaken. The SDS will run for the new parliamentary elections as a homogeneous alliance, and we should not delude ourselves on this point. There is even more: If we want to be realists, we should not fail to take the united opposition into consideration.

[Bonev] Should this also apply to the different trends within the opposition?

[Kyuranov] Such trends actually exist. They also differ in their approach to the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. Some of them believe that the BSP should merely lose the majority in parliament, others want the BSP to step down from the political scene, while a third group of SDS members insists that it should be outlawed. Differences of approach exist, but the united opposition as a whole has a negative attitude toward the BSP, a fact that consolidates its unity.

[Bonev] Is the SDS-Center likely to remove the main factors of mutual hostilities in parliament?

[Kyuranov] An incipient process of maturity is certainly under way in parliament today. The great confrontation between the BSP and the SDS exerted the most negative influence on the parliament's work so far. The confrontation, regardless of its profound causes, was also prompted by the absence of a center force as a factor of moderation, which, to a certain extent, should have stimulated the constructive spirit of the political forces on both sides of parliament.

[Bonev] Would you say that they might even embrace each other one day?

[Kyuranov] This is not necessary. The important thing is to accomplish a new step forward toward a new type of parliament. The British House of Commons, for example, is a parliament where two parties confront each other—even though the confrontation is not as sharp as in our country, which should be attributed to certain historical reasons, of course. In our Grand National Assembly, it has now become possible for different parties to play their own roles of separate, relative importance, such as is the case in the French type of parliaments. Despite the conditional character of such concepts, I am convinced that we are on the threshold of an important change.

Imagine! So far, the majority in parliament has had to show understanding for the minority on numerous occasions. Was this not a paradoxical situation? The majority was obliged to consider the opinion of the minority on the questions of local government, electing the president, forming the government, and appointing the prime minister!

I hope that from now on the minority, or at least a part of it, will be willing to consider the majority. Naturally, things should not go as far as imposing a diktat of the majority over the minority. This would be in contradiction with the democratic principles. [passage omitted]

[Bonev] How do the Bulgarian Socialists accept the SDS-Center?

[Kyuranov] The establishment of the SDS-Center will at least not cause a hardening of BSP positions. On the contrary, it may help the party to show greater understanding for the consolidation of democratic processes in our country. Such processes could be accelerated. However, we should not neglect another important factor—namely, the existence of the extraparlimentary opposition and especially the part that is trying to provoke and actually provokes an aggravation of social tensions. An alliance of this group from the extraparlimentary opposition with some extremist members of parliament would endanger the peaceful transition to democracy and social peace.

[Bonev] Do you not think that the establishment of the SDS-Center may consolidate the social democratic trends within the BSP?

[Kyuranov] This process is already under way, but, for the time being, it is developing more slowly than some of us would like it to. This fact should also be taken into consideration.

[Bonev] Do you have any idea about the response of your party's more conservative circles to the establishment of the SDS-Center?

[Kyuranov] When a specific, general trend prevails in the development of a society—which certainly applies to our

country, where the prevailing trend is toward democracy—this is inevitably likely to soften the positions of even the most inveterate party hard-liners. The trend will undoubtedly accelerate the renewal of the BSP.

BSP Received State Funds During 1990

*AU2604202691 Sofia BTA in English 2006 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 26 (BTA)—In 1990 the Bulgarian Socialist (ex-Communist) Party received 41 million leva from the exchequer. Forty million were allocated from the 1989 budget. In 1990 the political parties received a total of six million leva subsidies. Bulgarian TV audiences learned these facts this evening from Mr. Ilko Eskenazi MP, economic expert of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), and Mr. Vasil Kolarov MP of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), former governor of the National Bank.

The TV programme focused on the finance minister's report which ruled that the BSP, being the rightful successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), owes the state almost 3,000 million leva.

According to Mr. Vasil Kolarov this amount was received in the form of state subsidies and should not be returned. He said that the law provided for subsidizing political parties though this was not generally known. The former governor of the National Bank of Bulgaria tried to motivate the acquisition of these funds by the blend of the state with the BCP.

Mr. Ilko Eskenazi argued against this view. He said that there were no documents regulating the allocation of funds from the national budget to the BCP. The BCP itself took the funds. Parliament or any other state body did not authorize this transfer, Mr. Eskenazi said.

It became clear that though the BCP declared it was ready to return 60 per cent of its property, it has made no formal statement to this effect so far.

BSP Leaders Address May Day Meeting in Sofia

*AU2704190291 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1630 GMT 27 Apr 91*

[Text] Today, a festive meeting was held in the Georgi Kirkov Hall of the Socialists' Building in Sofia to mark 1 May. It consisted of a short concert and an almost three-hour-long meeting with leaders of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The participants included Aleksandur Lilov, Aleksandur Tomov, Nora Ananieva, Dimitur Yonchev, and other members of the BSP Supreme Council. They gave answers to many questions, including those on the goals and essence of the economic reform, their views regarding privatization, the opposition's demand for the BSP to return billions of leva to the state budget, and the future of the BSP Building.

Mr. Lilov said that the BSP is not afraid of holding the elections in June, because, in his view, the extremists in

the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] are, in fact, working for the victory of the BSP.

Aleksandur Tomov said it was absurd to hold parliamentary elections in two months' time. As far as the Socialists' future election platform is concerned, it will be severely pragmatic and will take account of the specific general and regional problems.

If we return 2.7 billion leva, this, in practice, will be tantamount to the nationalization of the party, said Aleksandur Tomov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council and deputy chairman of Council of Ministers. I know that this memorandum was prepared a month ago, and, if they submit it only five days before Minister Kostov presents the updated budget to parliament, it will be no accident. It surprises no one that they should launch this attack on us now, just before the elections, said Aleksandur Tomov. He added that he was seriously alarmed by how the reform was developing, and that he was against solely applying a monetary mechanism.

According to our reporter Angel Shoylev, who attended the meeting, a question was raised on whether any disagreements existed within the BSP leadership. To this, Aleksandur Lilov replied that differences did exist, but that this is quite natural. He added that the path of change is the only one the party can follow.

Indications of 'Rift' in SDS Opposition

*AU2604204391 Sofia BTA in English 2011 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 26 (BTA)—Today's declaration by 35 radically-minded MP's of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was followed by a counter-declaration by other SDS circles. The answer was read on television by the leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP), Dr. Petur Dertliev. The BSDP, the Nikola Petkov Agrarian Party, Ecoglasnost, the Green Party, the Democracy Clubs and individual members of other organizations subscribed to the answer. They all object to their colleagues' "extreme undemocratism." "The 35 MP's do not express the stand of the parliamentary SDS," Dr. Dertliev said.

The SDS Coordinating Council had no time to react to the differences in the parliamentary faction.

The declaration issued in answer to 35 MP's leaves the impression that most MP's of the SDS want to distance themselves clearly from the 35. Today's two declarations followed the formation of two blocs in the opposition coalition: the right-wing Neo-Liberals and SDS—Centre, and heighten the impression of a rift between them.

The declaration read by Dr. Dertliev stands up for republican principles and says that "anyone who openly avows or tacitly holds monarchist views is entirely devoid of political ethics." The 35 MP's make no mention of monarchy. Their declaration reiterates their

concern that the new constitution will not be democratic enough, while the declaration read by Dr. Dertliev stresses that the draft constitution is modelled after the Constitutions of the great Western democracies: the United States, France, Germany. "Declarations which dismiss it as worthless must be prompted by underhand political motives," Dr. Dertliev said.

Dr. Dertliev emphasized the objectives of the SDS: a change of the system and dislodgement of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] from power by lawful means. He described as "rash" his colleagues' desire to have the elections timed before the passage of the new constitution. The declaration of the 35 MP's was read on national radio today by Mr. Stoyan Ganev, the other co-chairman of the parliamentary SDS.

SDS MP's Demand July General Elections

*AU2604202791 Sofia BTA in English 1957 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 26 (BTA)—Thirty-five MP's of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) issued a declaration today threatening to walk out of parliament unless it dissolves itself on May 15 and new general elections are held on July 14, 1991.

The opposition MP's say that the parliamentary faction of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is working for a slow-pace perestroika. The breach of the January 1991 political agreement led to critical points in the work of the Grand National Assembly. There have been attempts to obstruct parliament in its law-making, to discuss purely political issues, and the passage of a genuinely democratic constitution and new economic legislation is still wishful thinking, the declaration points out.

"We are following with mounting anxiety attempts by certain revanchist circles in the BSP to put the political clock in Bulgaria back," the SDS MP's declare. Motions that the BSP and the other parties and organizations which have amassed property during the totalitarian period should return it to the state are invariably voted down, according to the declaration.

Its signatories voice concern over the fact that the BSP is blocking the passage of the Privatization Act. They believe that the Grand National Assembly is in danger of passing non-democratic laws and a non-democratic constitution.

"We suggest that parliament dissolve itself on May 15, and that the new parliamentary elections be held on July 14. Before that it should pass a resolution that the budget funds allocated to the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Komsomol from 1949 to 1990 should be included in the revenues of the updated 1991 national budget as proposed by the parliamentary SDS." The signers of the

declaration add that unless parliament meets their demand, they will walk out.

The signatories include: co-chairman of the Parliamentary SDS, Mr. Stoyan Ganev; the leader of the Democratic Party, Mr. Stefan Savov; leader of the Radical Democratic Party, Ms. Elka Konstantinova; SDS Spokesmen Mr. Mikhail Nedelchev and Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov; and Mr. Yanko Yankov, the only MP of the Liberal Congress Party (not affiliated to the SDS).

New Antifascist Union Declares Aims

*AU2604200491 Sofia BTA in English 1841 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 26 (BTA)—The Union of Fighters Against Fascism and Capitalism was renamed today Bulgarian Anti-Fascist Union at the national anti-fascist conference held here.

Bulgarian Anti-Fascists stressed that their union will pursue "its fight against Fascism, Neo-Fascism, monarchism and extremism, and in defence of the interests of the working people." According to information released at the conference, some 90 per cent of the union's 31,000 members are over seventy years of age.

This is the last in a series of parties and organizations which have changed their names. As a rule, they have been dropping qualifiers like "communist," "anti-imperialist," and "against capitalism," as discrediting in the eyes of the general public.

Now the "Anti-Fascists," also known as "active fighters," say that they live below the poverty line, but before November 10, 1989, they received high pensions and free medicines and enjoyed privileges in buying housing.

Recently the press has been calling into question the "anti-Fascist movement." Socialists insist that the resistance was a mass movement, while some historians assert the opposite on the grounds that Bulgaria was not occupied by German troops during World War II. The term "Anti-Fascists" used to apply to participants in the resistance between 1941 and 1944. These were mostly people connected with the left-wing parties and organizations. Even now when speaking of "fascism," "extremism" and "reaction," they usually have in mind their right-wing opponents.

Karakachanov Reelected Green Party Leader

*AU2804185691 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1730 GMT 28 Apr 91*

[Text] The Green Party Second National Conference elected party leaders. Aleksandur Karakachanov was elected chairman of the party by a great majority. One of the deputy chairmen also was elected. He is Lyubomir Ivanov, leader of the Green Party parliamentary faction. The second deputy chairman did not get the necessary majority, and a second round will be necessary.

The conference adopted a declaration that reads:

"The Green Party confirms the liberal character of its program and orientation and its willingness to cooperate with all liberal organizations of the Bulgarian opposition and members of the Union of Democratic Forces. The Green Party supports the immediate return to the state of property on the part of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the utilization of this property for the social needs of the reform. The Green Party supports the difficult tasks of the government and thinks that the elections for the new parliament will be a decisive step along the road to changing the political system.

"The conference is yet to adopt the party's charter and program. A proposal has been submitted to change the party's name to "Liberal Green Party." In this context, Mr. Filip Dimitrov announced that the liberal character of the Green Party is shared by all. Apparently this prompted all those who disagree with certain actions of the Green Party National Council and parliamentary faction to remain party members."

Social Democratic Ideology Analyzed

91BA0273A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian
5, 12, 18 Jan 91

[Article in three installments by Plamen Stanukov, sociologist: "Reflections in a Rose-Colored Mirror—Ideology Problems as Social Democracy Consolidates"—first paragraph is SVOBODEN NAROD introduction]

[5 Jan pp 6-7]

[Text] In three consecutive issues of our 16-page publication, we shall publish the reflections of the sociologist Plamen Stanukov on the ideological basis of the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party] and the united opposition, on the principal differences between the Bulgarian neoconservatives and the social democrats on the question of the social organization of our society, and on the war between social democracy and bolshevism.

One year after the beginning of the democratic changes in the totalitarian power structures, the problem of consolidating their own social basis within the framework of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] electorate has taken on paramount importance for the political forces in Bulgaria. Each party's social basis is formed by the group of aware adherents to its political doctrine, while the group itself constitutes the nucleus of the political party's electorate. For the present, the social basis of the individual democratic parties in the SDS coalition is hard to distinguish. Since the middle of the summer, the political leaders in the SDS have begun to indite their epistles. They no longer talk about "thousands of sympathizers," but, in defending their proposals, they invoke "the will of the electorate." At the same time, they and their cohorts do everything possible through party newspapers and mass information media

to explain the nuances of party positions on vital questions of everyday life. On the other hand, in dialogue among themselves, SDS leaders make their dominant theme not so much appeals to rebuff attempts to restore totalitarianism as the necessity to defend democracy on the basis of the acknowledged individuality of the political forces. More generally, the large political parties have attacked the efforts of the "nonentity" parties to organize their own social base as a nucleus of their electorate.

These new factors set the norm for the process of civic political identification, a process that, under Bulgarian conditions, has taken place in its mirror-image dimension.

The electorate of the democratic forces has been formed instinctively by rejection of Bolshevism's chimeras and practice regarding opposition leaders. Up to this moment, the aspiration to gain a majority in the Grand National Assembly elections has been paramount in the two polarized political camps. This has, in maximum measure, given rise to the polarization of civic society, while the concomitant tendency toward internal consolidation of the political forces has remained hidden, imperceptible. With the conversion of the civic opposition into a working parliamentary opposition, and with the division of power in the local administrative bodies between the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the SDS coalition (with the participation of the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] and the Fatherland Union), the process whereby the political parties consolidate their own social base has become decisive for the progress of a civic movement to clear the ground for the structures of posttotalitarianism.

A shadow is cast on the process of conscious political identification by the specter of fear, lest civic society once more be duped into being a hostage of foreign interests. During the year of democratic changes we have been through, the traditional distrust by Bulgarians of their rulers has retrogressed into pessimism about the ideal of equality and social justice. For years that ideal was used to conceal the self-seeking interest of the Communist Establishment. The possibility that democracy will assure not only social order and prosperity, but also profits and impunity for arriviste economic magnates in the new situation is a realistic political factor, which reflects on the efforts of the political parties in the SDS to consolidate their social base.

Citizens' mirror political identification, through acceptance or rejection of political leaders' personality (under the influence of the prevalent distrust of "bootlicking"), threatens in the near future to disunite the electorate of the democratic opposition. In Bulgaria, there is practically no middle generation of democrats, and the SDS electorate is now growing principally under the influence of the BSP leaders' declining prestige. Ideologically, the middle generation of Bulgarians was molded by the dogmas of a Bolshevik-type education, dogmas that,

first, prevent their assessing political leaders' actions from the viewpoint of the nuances in ideological doctrine and, second, provide antedated grounds for distrust of politicians. If, under these conditions, there continues a predilection to eulogize the past grandeur and role of the democratic organizations in sociopolitical life prior to 1947, the middle generation of democrats will be inculcated with a spirit of nostalgia. As long as the SDS parties keep their adherents "in the dark" about the essence of their ideological doctrines and about the priorities in the political struggle, they will receive their vote of confidence only on credit. It must not be forgotten that, although communism is on the way out in all Eastern Europe, in our country, bolshevism is still lording it at the state table.

Our fellow countryman has no suspicion at all of bolshevism's ability at mimicry and observes with disgust the lessons in good eating that yesterday's courtiers are trying to teach the opposition. The wonderful opportunities to provide for the future that the posttotalitarian disorder grants the postbolshevist demagogues additionally impede not only civic ideological identification but also the process of consolidating the social base of the radical parties in the SDS electorate.

Here social democracy enjoys a "small" advantage: The high rating that the BSDP leaders retain is proof that social democracy has been spared the suspicion that it harbors self-seeking interests. The ideology of social democracy was rejected by the procommunist *nomenklatura*. In the political arena, the BSDP does not count on the support of the red bullies from the city and the countryside, and their representatives in the Grand National Assembly have followed the adversaries of social democracy's ideals, tactics, and strategy. The fact that the BSDP is, on a mass scale, regarded as the genuine successor to the idea of freedom, equality, and social justice contributes significantly to the consolidation of aware civic adherents of social democracy from the middle generation.

Social democracy has never claimed to have a monopoly on the ideological transformation of the democratic principles on which is erected every modern rule of law state with public institutions and a market economy. On this score, the BSDP's ideological competitor is not the mimetic Bulgarian Communist Party, which remains ideologically immunized against the beneficent influence of the common human values of the doctrines of bolshevism. The principles of a harmonious civic society have been incorporated in the foundation of the *Weltanschauung* of the adherents of renascent neoconservatism, better known today as democratic radicalism.

Traditionally, it is thought that, in their synthesis, the ideals of liberty, equality, and justice constitute the substance of the concept of democracy. Thus, democracy is accepted intuitively as some kind of ideal social state of affairs. Consistent political social democracy understands democracy to be a form of government that ensures full or partial realization of the common human

principles incorporated in its foundation. For social democrats, democracy is not an unchanging state of affairs, and, for its development, it needs the vigilant conscience of the associated citizenry. The democratic character of state institutions is determined by the quality of political pluralism. It is on the foundation of the consensus regarding this question that the political unity of the SDS is established, but, as regards the view of the individual parties on the order of the measures to be taken for the development of democracy, serious ideological differences exist.

[12 Jan p 7]

[Text]

Liberalism, Conservatism, and the Social Democratic Idea

Our Neoconservatives on the Priority in the Realization of Common Human Values

For radical democrats, the road to freedom and civic dignity proceeds by the priority accumulation of private property. Thus, the present-day movement to clear the ground for posttotalitarian economic and political structures is only a means for "expropriation of the red expropriators" under the watchword of total privatization. For the long term, our homebred neoconservatives expect or promise that, with the increase of individual and national wealth, the field of social justice and security will expand "more and more." In today's social realities, this conception only revives the mass bias against the defects of totalitarian socialism, with its absurd authoritarian administrative system, which protected the interest, impunity, and privileges of the minority that had got power into its hands and that, unwarrantably labeled a "people's democracy," oppressed the citizen-stewards of "nobody's" administrative property. Although in the present-day economic and social situation—a situation burdened with the defects of the past, renascent neoconservatism, as historically preordained, remains with the framework of the democratic movement, on analysis of the actions of the radical democrats in the sphere of practical politics the fundamental alienation of native neoconservatism from the liberal nuances in the ideology of classical neoconservatism is striking.

Bourgeois Liberalism and Bourgeois Conservatism

In the 1970's, bourgeois liberalism and bourgeois conservatism entered into an ideological and political symbiosis under the influence of changing social realities. Conservatism adopted a liberal attitude toward the individual and toward citizens' needs and rejected the primitive policy of achieving a relative social emancipation, in the main by the concentration of capital. Classical bourgeois neoconservatism today uses the public institutions in the state as a means of ensuring equal opportunities for the progress of citizens and as wealth without

assuming a commitment to ensure the nation's minimum standard of living. Conversely, our neoconservatives now see their mission to lie in the priority introduction of total privatization. The facts of recent months indicate that, by ignoring liberal ideas in the name of profits and power, they give an opportunity to the new economic aristocracy to seek and find an ally in the person of the red partocracy on the basis of the castrated ideology of democratic radicalism.

Essence of Social Democratic Idea of Social Organization of Society

Renascent social democracy in its ideology and policy remains consistent with the ideas and policy of world social democracy. Both base themselves on the pancultural ideas of liberty, justice, and social security; national prosperity; patriotism; a European cultural identity; a right of indemnification for harm suffered due to somebody else's negligence; protection of the individual against arbitrariness by those in power; and other ideas that to this day preserve their unfading luster. The BSDP gives priority to efforts to build the social organization of society. For social democracy, the process of transforming bolshevik totalitarianism into a civilized public body politic does not begin with stimulation of the slavish practice of "individual building of socialism and communism," today reduced to a striving for uncontrolled and speculative self-enrichment. Social democrats see the state from the very first as a public institution only if once more it is used as an instrument for mirror-image "expropriation of the expropriators," if it ensures mass participation of the citizenry in government, and if, in practice, it guarantees national prosperity and social security through gradual privatization.

Although the roots of the idea of the social organization of society lie in the past of our native social democracy, history only partially explains the new political phenomena, tactics, and strategy of the reborn BSDP. These are, in maximum measure, due to the distinctive features in the development of world social democracy, which chiefly affect the role, activity, and ideology of the present-day BSDP. In the 1970's, at the same time as the formation of ideological and political neoconservatism, the European social democratic parties finally abandoned the proletarian idiom of classical Marxism and began to evolve as sociological parties. Paramount in the ideology and policy of social democracy became its aspiration to be transformed into spokesman for the common human interests of the vast bulk of the citizenry, regardless of the class or occupation of which they were part. In this initiative, it succeeded fully. Under the influence of the same tendency but, so to speak, instinctively, reborn social democracy has taken up the torch from the last relay in spite of the fact that the middle generation of democrats is now being inculcated in our country. It is as a sociological party that the BSDP is present on the political scene, a fact that puts it in contrast to the other democratic political organizations that are still in the swaddling clothes of class and occupational narrow-mindedness. The BSDP is on an

equal footing with the parties of the Socialist International and, in this sense, the doctrine of the social organization of society reflects the evolution of world social democracy. Unlike the radical democrats, who are trying to make an "American," "English," or "German" state in the Balkans, the social democrats from the very first have worked on behalf of humanism, prosperity, and social security. In its political activity, the BSDP rests on progressive ideological doctrine and does not determine its procedure solely in keeping with its dream of a high standard.

These are the essential ideological differences within the SDS coalition, which are foreordained by the citizens' mirror-image political identification and which, like a presence in a shadow, determine the process of the radical parties' consolidation of their own social base. The negative attitude of the social democrats toward certain nuances in the ideology of the radical democrats will not, in the final analysis, torpedo the unity of the democratic forces' electorate. Its attitude only emphasizes the attractiveness and promise of social democratic political doctrine and activity.

[18 Jan p 4]

Attitude of Social Democrats Toward the BSP; Doctrine of Social Organization in Our Country as an Expression of Things Unfinished on a World Scale

[Text] Unlike the most radical social forces, the BSDP is not striving for the physical destruction of the BSP. In today's political situation, social democracy is first and foremost a liquidator of postbolshevism in its democratic reincarnations. This political line is inscribed in the tendency to turn the BSP into a "nonentity" party on the model of every totalitarian organization under conditions of democracy, such as the neo-Fascist parties in Europe, for example. Social democrats, as convinced humanists, do not deny anyone the right to believe, even in the dogmas of bolshevism. They only foster the evolution of its ideological insolvency to a social absurdity within the process of clearing the ground for post-totalitarianism.

As a sign of its fatal destiny, the physical adherents of social communism in our country are dwindling in number. The BSP has driven away almost all of its independently thinking members, enthusiastic over the idea of radical changes in favor of democratization. Politically, the BSP is exhibiting a recurrence of the "majority's" unwillingness to accept the "minority's" free thinking, even when the "minority" has set itself the goal of preserving the party as a strong political organization. By its hypocritical debolshevization, the BSP has driven away also the orthodox bolsheviks, who have found a haven in the reborn BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. It is there that the enthusiastic part of the cohort of "party warriors," who to all appearances bear no blame for the social catastrophe and who did not batten off totalitarianism, have massed. If these people had felt themselves to be at least slightly threatened or guilty,

they would have lain low in the BSP, which very selectively parted company with its compromised members. In the political cacophony, both BCP's sound like the opening chords of a "Symphony of Fate." It is natural that a group of philosophers and intellectuals from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and higher educational institutions should surmount their political blunders and political passivism. It is much more difficult for people shaped by the Stalinist textbook *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* to disregard the communist virtues, chief of which is subordination to officialdom, based on blind faith, and readiness to sacrifice oneself on behalf of the "idea." The expulsion of the nostalgist bolsheviks changed the process of reducing the BSP to a "nonentity" party into an irreversible one.

Mindful of these realities, the BSDP is exposing the chameleonlike character of the ideology of postbolshevism. At the moment, the BSP has no elaborated ideology but posts up a few amateurish "platforms." The facts of this past year indicate that the stand of the "party of competence" in the political scene is the hope—and the one hope only—of intensifying the social crisis still more. Social communism is dangerous, not because it has a certain public support, but because in the chaos of posttotalitarianism it preserves the possibility of making secure careers and official privileges. Posttotalitarianism is not the democracy we dream of; it is not yet a civilized social system based on a coherent civic constitution, public institutions, and a market economy. The defects of posttotalitarianism take the form of the threat of a creeping restoration of totalitarianism, progressive reduction of production, profiteering, relative anarchy ensuring complete impunity, arrogant disregard of moral values. In just this situation, the citizenry feels extremely uneasy, and the bolshevik barons play-act their crooked deals.

The BSP's social base and electorate are already consolidated solely on a foundation of mercenary interest and political naivete. From an "organization of word-bearers" and a "national party," in a year's time the BSP has vegetated into a national association of "partocracy" and a workers' economic and scientific aristocracy that is to blame for the national catastrophe. And, while for the democratic forces posttotalitarianism is only an unattractive stage on the road toward a democratic social order, for the neocommunists it is an opportune substitute for "democratic socialism," which, with just a "little more law and order," will assure them permanent immunity from accountability for their deeds and an assured presence among the authorities.

Journalist Yonev on Bulgarian KGB Collaborators

AU2704160991 Sofia BTA in English 1517 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 27 (BTA)—The turning of the former State Security into a peculiar Balkan branch of the KGB by no means meant that Moscow did not infiltrate its emissaries in Bulgaria and did not recruit local agents of

the KGB, Mr. Vladimir Yonev, the correspondent of Radio Deutsche Welle, said in an interview for "DIALOG." According to him, over the past 45 years in Bulgaria there worked 1,800 KGB "representatives" and 10,000 local "agents" of the KGB.

Mr. Yonev has a list of names of Bulgarians who collaborated with the KGB, compiled at his request by a regular officer of the Bulgarian intelligence. He declined to mention the names included in this list "which is of an informal nature and can disturb nobody's sleep," according to the journalist. "All I can say is that the list includes the name of a former secretary of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], who maintained excellent relations with the former KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov and later with Vladimir Kryuchkov as well. It also mentions the name of a former alternate member of the Politburo and former minister at the Bulgarian Embassy in Moscow and of a rather suspicious character who became a member of the Politburo and who established his first contacts with the KGB as a chief of one of Bulgaria's arms factories. A former foreign minister, who later reached the very top, received the personal blessing of the KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov for his intentions to stage a coup on the eve of November 10, 1989, Mr. Yonev asserts. He intends to refer to the KGB Public Relations Centre for more information on this issue during his forthcoming visit to Moscow.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Gal, Flamik Speeches on VPN Dissension

AU1604122891

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 9 April on page 6 publishes the "full texts" of speeches made by Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence (VPN) Slovak Council, and Juraj Flamik, chairman of the VPN Coordinating Center, at an "extraordinary meeting" of the VPN Slovak Council held in the west Slovak town of Trencianske Teplice on 6 April. The 2,000-word Gal speech and the 1,800-word Flamik speech are both devoted entirely to the split in the VPN movement and to the prospects of cooperation between the two VPN factions.

In his speech, Gal first charges that the founding of the VPN-For a Democratic Slovakia platform "had the character of a putsch" within the movement. The split in the VPN, he says, has "fundamentally changed not only the situation in the Slovak political scene but the social situation in the country in general."

Gal goes on to analyze the composition of the For a Democratic Slovakia platform. He says that its "core" is made up of representatives of district VPN organizations who are "dissatisfied with the implementation of social changes at the local level and who blame the movement's political center for their dissatisfaction." Most of them hope that a "strong personality" at the

head of the movement, such as Prime Minister Meciar, will "resolve their problems." Gal describes this hope as "nothing else but an attempt to rid oneself of responsibility for one's own failure or incompetence." The activists of Meciar's platform, Gal continues, also include VPN representatives whose "individual ambitions remained unfulfilled" in the postrevolutionary era because they did not come into power. Many members of the new platform are those who "simply do not belong to the VPN by virtue of their views." This is demonstrated by the fact that the signatories of the new platform are identical with those who had disagreed with the VPN's official line during the language law debate or who hold a different attitude to the constitutional arrangement of the Republic. Gal therefore believes that "the sooner they make their platform independent [of the VPN] and give it the appropriate name, the better not only for the VPN but also for the still uncrystallized and nontransparent political scene in Slovakia." Finally, Gal mentions yet another "cadre source of the For a Democratic Slovakia platform"—members of the Obroda (Revival) club associating reform communists. "Signals coming from the districts" reportedly show that "often it is precisely the members of Obroda, many of whom are experienced party apparatchiks of 20 years ago, who organize cells of the newly formed For a Democratic Slovakia platform."

Gal says that, although this "peculiar conglomerate of interests" has not yet presented its program, it can be assumed that the For a Democratic Slovakia platform will seek a "more social" economic reform, the accentuation of the "national dimension of social transformations," and vigorous support for the policies of Vladimir Meciar.

Speaking about the relationship between the VPN and the breakaway platform, Gal says that, following the events of the last few weeks, a "reconciliation in the sense of reunification" is no longer possible. Early elections would also be undesirable, according to Gal, as they would jeopardize the key tasks of the immediate future—the economic reform and the drafting of constitutions. The only way to "consolidate" the domestic political situation is therefore the "legalization" of the split at a VPN assembly. In Gal's opinion, this assembly should also "adopt an agreement on coalition ties between the platform and the VPN." This coalition agreement should remain in force until the start of the next election campaign.

Although Gal concedes that consensus between the two VPN factions is necessary for the "normal functioning of governments and parliaments," at the same time he formulates several conditions for the conclusion of such a consensus: "There can be no consensus without the platform giving up the challenging of the legitimate bodies and personalities of the movement. A dialogue will also scarcely be possible, unless statements are recalled which called in question the VPN's hitherto course of action in implementing the A Chance for Slovakia program (I am thinking, for example, of the

questioning of the law on division of powers and of the constitutional arrangement of the state, etc.). We also have reason to insist that no changes be carried out in the government that would, in our opinion, stand in the way of the implementation of the government program." Likewise, Gal says that he can "scarcely conceive of an agreement [between the two VPN factions] without political responsibility being drawn for the present domestic political situation in Slovakia and in the federation at large." He admits, however, that it is up to the Slovak National Council to assess this responsibility. Gal also reiterates that "the platform's legitimization must take place on the premises of a VPN assembly and in a way that will be politically transparent (that is, the For a Democratic Slovakia platform must clearly politically declare its position and role in the current political scene)."

In his speech, Gal also formulates the VPN's current tasks. As regards the VPN's position on the political scene, he says, the movement must "define itself more clearly as a liberal political grouping of the center" and define the social groups that it would like to address. As part of its process of "self-identification," the movement must also update its A Chance for Slovakia electoral platform. In particular, it must "specify in greater detail the path toward a truly civic society." In this context Gal describes the current "explosions of separatism, racial and national intolerance, and social unrest" as proof that the VPN was proceeding toward this aim "slowly and awkwardly." He hopes that these explosions will remain a short-term affair for "otherwise our vision of a democratic Slovakia would become an unrealizable dream." Furthermore, the VPN must "project a new image of the movement." This should include the VPN's presentation to the outside world as a modern political movement of the center.

In concluding, Gal expresses his conviction that the VPN will benefit from the legalization of the split and from the departure of the breakaway platform.

Juraj Flamik's speech is a review of the history of the VPN split. The chairman of the VPN Coordinating Center blames the protagonists of the For a Democratic Slovakia platform for the split, saying that the platform's founding was "illegitimate" and that all its subsequent steps have been marked by "disregard for democracy within the movement." Flamik also accuses the rival faction of "violations of the movement's statutes." One example is that members of the platform include members of other political parties and movements.

In his speech Flamik formulates several "conditions" for a settlement between the two VPN factions. To make possible talks "within the framework of valid VPN bodies," the For a Democratic Slovakia platform must eliminate the following "barriers," according to Flamik:

"It must clearly formulate its program with regard to the constitutional arrangement of the state and the constitutional process of drafting the constitutions;

"Specify its program as regards the principles and the strategy of economic reform;

"Recognize the legitimacy of the movement's bodies, not only in a token way but in practical terms, by participating in the work of these bodies;

"Revoke statements that do not recognize and call in question the movement's legitimate bodies;

"Revoke all statements casting doubt on persons at the head of these bodies;

"Support the efforts of the Slovak National Council at the objective investigation of the activity of the government and of Prime Minister Meciar (the For a Democratic Slovakia platform voted against the relevant resolution of the Slovak National Council Presidium);

"And refrain from challenging parliamentary democracy and present Slovak National Council bodies, particularly the Slovak National Council Presidium (I am thinking of the statement [by Prime Minister Meciar] about the need to change the Slovak National Council Presidium)."

POLAND

Western Model Proposed for Regional Divisions

91EP0383A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
20 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Jozwiak: "Dividing Poland"]

[Text] For several months now opinions have been heard to the effect that it is high time to replace the current voivodships with "10 to 12 strong regions," as the prime minister put it.

In Europe, two types of regional organization of space have emerged. These types may be called Eastern and Western. The Western type includes the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, France, Germany together with Austria and the Rhine [delta] countries, the British Isles and Scandinavia, as well as Bohemia, and, with certain reservations, the Balkan countries. The West European regional traditions also extend to the east of the continent covering the Baltic area.

A mosaic of provinces is characteristic in Western Europe. These provinces differ from one another in terms of historical traditions, and frequently in terms of their own, cultivated dialects, and distinct customs. Provinces do not have to strictly coincide with formal units of administrative division. In some states, formal divisions honor old, historic lands; this is the case in, for example, Italy, Austria, and Germany. In other countries, in France for example, arbitrary administrative decisions have been superimposed over historical divisions erasing the latter to some degree. The power of the Western type of provinces is not based on formal elements but on the consciousness of their residents. Provinces have plainly drawn boundaries; they have their

names, and there is never any doubt as to what side of a local boundary a particular locality is on. The residents are also aware of their regional affiliation.

The East European type appears in Belorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine. Names of regions are almost absent from the maps of this area. If they do exist, it is impossible to guess where their borders are; their names, such as Polesye, the Volga area, or the Urals duplicate strictly geographic features. In Russia, units such as the land of Smolensk, Vitebsk Voivodship, and the Great Principality of Novgorod were the historical equivalents of West European provinces; at present, so is, for example, Stavropol Kray. The striking feature of these territorial units is that they do not have their own names, but derive them from the city of their seat, and it is precisely this center that is something permanent, whereas the borders of the territory subordinated to the city are fluid and random, and depend on the arbitrary decisions of authorities. In the East, a territory has no identity of its own; it is secondary in relation to the center-city from which power emanates.

The West European type is organic; it is anchored in time and space. The Eastern type is to a great degree a result of manipulations by the authorities which is always centralized and hierarchical to some degree, and is usually imposed from the outside.

The West and East of Europe have also produced different types of attitudes toward local divisions on the part of state authorities. The Western style called for adapting extemporaneous, formal divisions to "organic" lines which survived due to the power of tradition. The provinces existed, lived, and were a reality. The easiest thing to do was to legalize them by assigning viceregents from the capital city to oversee them. In turn, in the Eastern style the authorities created territorial units, slicing the territory with arbitrary borders, frequently on the principle of equal distances from centers.

An Exceptional Opportunity

A division into voivodships cannot be extemporaneous, random, and arbitrarily established.

In these years (and maybe actually only in 1991) we have an exceptional opportunity to introduce a division with which both we and our great-grandchildren will be comfortable.

A line which separates the "Europe of provinces" and the "Europe of districts" outlined above, runs through Poland. In the west of the country, we have old names of provinces: Silesia, Pomerania, Kujawy, Warmia. In the east, we use terms such as the Lublin area, the Bialystok area, or the Kielce area in order to indicate regional affiliation. This issue is associated with the Polish "gap in biography," or partitions. In the territory of the old, prepartitioned Polish state, in its western (i.e., non-Russian segment) a typically western array of provinces existed with well-defined borders, the names of which were not derived from those of cities or rivers, and which

had traditions and a feeling of belonging. However, the formal units, the voivodships, were smaller than these provinces. These were provinces such as Great Poland, Little Poland, Mazowsze with Podlasie, Prusy (at present, rather Eastern Pomerania and Mazury), and Pomerania and Silesia which were outside the domain of the kings from Krakow and Warsaw. The Eastern type was always characteristic of the Russian lands of the [Polish] Republic. This old regional division was seriously (and certainly irrevocably) erased by the borders of the partitioning states drawn without any regard to the historical features of territories, and by the lines of arbitrary administrative divisions, initially those of the partitioning states and subsequently Polish. The attitude of the authorities toward territory in Poland has been typically Eastern in the past two centuries.

Therefore, at present our situation is such that we should look at the country attentively and discover the origins of its proper regional structure which, if supported and legalized by a new administrative-political division, will gradually become something natural and convenient, something that evokes attachment and local patriotism and releases the instincts of a master. You cannot pull such a division out of a hat; it must be based on certain premises.

The first premise is the existence of distinct center cities around which the future regions should congeal. The People's Republic of Poland was, at least from the formal point of view, an extremely centralized state, where the capital city had absolute superiority over outlying areas. Yet, despite this centralization, Poland has remained a geographically policentric area. Warsaw by no means dominates Poland the way Paris dominates France or Moscow dominates Russia, to say nothing of smaller states with overgrown capitals, such as Denmark, Finland, Romania, or Hungary. From the point of view of the proportion of the capital, we are even closer to a typically policentric Germany. If we take into account the entire weight of cities as centers of decisionmaking, economy, science, politics, and so on, we have, besides the undoubtedly number one Warsaw, at least three subcapitals—Krakow, Poznan, and Gdansk. Katowice (with its satellites) and Wroclaw approximate them in weight; they are followed by Lodz, Szczecin, Lublin, and Bydgoszcz. These are 10 cities which have every opportunity to become local capitals. The value of six of the cities on this list is enhanced by the fact that they are the capitals of the aforementioned historical provinces; they are Szczecin, Gdansk, Poznan, Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Krakow.

The second premise is the existence of the absolute fact existence that border lines [are a result of] political cuts across Poland. The territorial policy of the People's Republic of Poland attempted to camouflage these lines, which was reflected most emphatically in the course of the 1974 reform of local administration. The commonality of historical experiences by a region, even if they have been unfavorable experiences such as war damage or forced colonization, are, after all, a mighty binding

factor which should not be given up, of course, as long as we are not held captive by ideology and dogmas. This suggests that new regional divisions should use old border lines. From among these lines, the former western border, which separates Western Pomerania, Silesia, and Prusy, which is now called Mazury, from the rest of the country, is the most obvious and visible. The border of the Austrian partition separating the old Galicia is another border line which is still visible locally. Galicia, though not an old historical province, has preserved well the cohesion and identity it developed during its autonomy within the framework of the Hapsburg empire. The third border from the time of the partitions, which cuts through Great Poland and Kujawy, and separates Wloclawek from Inowroclaw and Kalisz from Ostrow, is the most artificial. It is also the one which has been erased to the greatest degree, and it does not merit attention.

Finally, it is obvious that the old, prepartition array of six or seven historical provinces, the traditions of subsequent administrative divisions, and geographic, economic, and sentimental relations should be taken into account in designing new regions.

The issue of nomenclature is not clear-cut. The new units may be called voivodships. Tradition speaks in favor of this term; a tremendous devaluation of the notion voivodship which occurred when Gierek manufactured almost 50 of these units, some of which were very similar to previous powiats, speaks against this term.

Suggestions

Western Pomerania, a typical historically distinct area in the best West European style, opens the list of proposed units.

The existence, the distinct character, and the historical identity of the province of Great Poland are beyond a doubt; its borders are less unambiguous. A historical line separating it from Silesia is discernible. Its segment from Kepno to Wschowa survived until the Gierek reform; it should subsequently be extended somewhat to the north of the Odra [River]. In the 1950's and 1960's, the region of Lubusko Land was promoted. I see no reason for it to exist further because Zielona Gora is situated in Lower Silesia, and the lands around Gorzow, which in the Middle Ages were lost by Poland to Brandenburg would now return under the wing of Poznan. Its eastern and northeastern borders are by necessity a matter of convention because they cut through an old historical region. The border of the Poznan Voivodship before 1974 appears to be sufficiently good.

Silesia is a markedly distinct area. The division into Upper and Lower Silesia likewise is beyond a doubt. Perhaps, the line between the two Silesian provinces should be further to the east than the current border of Opole Voivodship, in order to better distinguish the Lower Silesian area populated by new immigrants from the east, from the Upper Silesian area with a substantial



share of "old Silesians" some of whom consider themselves Germans. The eastern boundary of Upper Silesia is a great enigma. Certainly, only a referendum among the populace could resolve the issue of affiliation. Is the feeling of the historical separateness of Silesia and the [Upper Silesian Coal] Basin (or Little Poland) stronger, or is the commonality of the economic region? Perhaps, it will be more correct to return to historical boundaries which would provide better protection for the regional traditions of Silesians.

On the enclosed map, the province of Eastern Pomerania includes the former Gdansk and Olsztyn Voivodships to the Prussian border in the east. Preserving this old, altogether archaic border appears to be a matter of respect for our own history. However, this region is not internally cohesive. The history, traditions, and population of the vicinity of Gdansk, the former Royal Prussia, and Warmia together with the former Principality of Prussia, are simply different. In the variant of division into 12 [provinces], we should separate out an individual province called Warmia and Mazury or, if we have enough courage, Prusy. The economic and personnel weakness of this region which, after all, is an artificial

southern half of historical Prussia with the capital in Koenigsberg, speaks against this solution.

The province with the proposed name Kujawy (despite the fact that historical Kujawy amounts to one-quarter of this area) includes the lands of broadly interpreted Great Poland: Wloclawek, Inowroclaw, and Bydgoszcz, and the lands of Royal Prussia—Torun and Grudziadz. This province coincides with the former Bydgoszcz Voivodship. The policentric nature of this region is noteworthy.

Historical Little Poland broke up irretrievably along the line of the Vistula and the Roztocze [Rivers]. The influence of the Hapsburgs is still visible. Let us call this province Southern Little Poland. Its area would be a combination of the prepartition Krakow Voivodship and Galicia, and would include Czestochowa, Olkusz, and Miechow, leaving out Tarnobrzeg and Stalowa Wola, where the border of partitions was broken, yielding to the logic of geographic and economic ties (the COP [Central Industrial District], sulfur, and the old center in Sandomierz).

The Beskidy Foreland is a problem. In this case (like in Tarnobrzeg Voivodship), the Gierek reform did work

out. A microregion around Bielsko-Biala is not an artificial creation. Would the Beskidy Foreland, which at one time was one under the Hapsburgs (though as two provinces), like to belong to Little Poland in its entirety?

A sensible division of the former Congressional Kingdom presents the greatest difficulty because the amount of bureaucratic arbitrariness there has been the greatest over the past two centuries. This has caused the borders of the regions to be erased, and a local identity to wither away. I propose to separate out Southern Little Poland with the capital in Lublin, which would include somewhat less than the former Lublin and Kielce Voivodships. The remainder should be used to cut out Mazowsze.

Podlasie presents a certain problem. A historical Podlasie was a Lithuanian borderland populated by the Mazurs which, taking advantage of the Lublin Union, joined the Congress Kingdom of Poland directly. However, it did not join Mazowsze, which at the time retained the remnants of independence, but rather Little Poland. This is how the difference between Podlasie and Mazowsze, which is historically random and transitory, was preserved until the time of the third partition. At present, Podlasie has no defined boundaries and no local capital, because Bialystok has grown on its periphery. The Bialystok area is a later creation, that of the 19th and 20th centuries; it is shifted further to the north and east compared to Podlasie (a segment of which it includes). Incidentally, the notion of Mazowsze, Kurpie, and Podlasie promoted under Gomulka simply flies in the face of logic, it is like saying trees and pine trees. A province around Bialystok, with the conventional name Podlasie, is possible in the variant of divisions into 12 units. However, this would be a weak region; the protection or possible autonomy of the Lithuanian and Belorussian minorities would be the only rationale for its existence. In the variant with 10 provinces, the surroundings of Bialystok and Suwalki would belong to Mazowsze.

This leaves us with the vicinity of Lodz. Historically, this used to be the eastern segment of Great Poland, the history of which took its own path. At present, it would be impossible to artificially tie it to Poznan. In olden times, not a single large urban center developed there. The development of Leczyca stopped in the Middle Ages; Sieradz and Piotrkow were taller than their surroundings by a finger, but not by a head. Lodz itself formed too suddenly and has preserved the character of an industrial village. Towns in the vicinity still have not forgiven Lodz for this promotion. Cutting Lodz Voivodship down to the mere suburbs [of Lodz] in the 1974 division is proof of that. Previously, Lodz Voivodship had little cohesion. Wieruszow and Sieradz looked to Poznan, and the southern gminas to Katowice. Skerniewice, Lowicz, and Kutno longed for Warsaw from which they were separated in the 1930's. However, breaking up this region is not recommended, and the Lodz Province should be created.

Katyn Documents Found in Krakow Institute

*LD2204164291 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1300 GMT 22 Apr 91*

[Text] Archives from Katyn have been found in Krakow during repair works being done in the attic of the Forensic Institute. Copies of protocols compiled from the examination of exhibits found during exhumations on the spot of the Katyn massacre were hidden in a special hiding place. Almost all of the 300 or so protocols, containing also a number of hitherto unknown memoirs of prisoners in the Kozielsk camp as well as a unique plan of this camp, are countersigned by authentic signatures of Dr. Jan Robel and his collaborators, who in the years 1943-44 conducted an examination of exhibits gathered during exhumation work in Katyn.

The box with the Katyn archives was hidden between the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953 in fear of being destroyed, it was announced today in Krakow. They are not only the richest source of historical knowledge on the Katyn crime but also they can provide, as Jozef [name indistinct], voivodship prosecutor in Krakow has disclosed, a documentation for a trial.

ROMANIA

Retired General on Political Situation

*91BA0473A Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
26 Mar 91 p 12*

[Interview with General Stefan Kostyali, retired, by Adina Anghelescu and Liviu Valenas; place and date not given]

[Text] General Stefan Kostyali was one of the generals who plotted against Ceausescu. In 1956 Stefan Kostyali, at 34, became the youngest general in the Romanian Army. Ten years later Nicolae Ceausescu retired him at the age of only 44. The official reason given was Gen. Kostyali's refusal to not officialize his relationship (of which a child was born) with his fiancée, whose "enormous" fault was that she was a Soviet citizen. Since 1970 Gen. Kostyali also "enjoyed" house arrest. After 22 December 1989 he continued to lead a retiring life.

[BARICADA] General, now, more than 14 months since the events of 22 December 1989, how do you view the plot against Ceausescu?

[Kostyali] Compared to our hopes, the 14 months since the Revolution have been as many months of disillusion. The 22 December 1989 events came as something completely unexpected to us, because we never thought it would take such a violent and radical form. On the first day people did not shout "Down with communism" (merely "Down with the dictatorship" and "Down with Ceausescu"), but the next day they were already shouting "Down with communism!" So we skipped several stages and went straight into a phase of extreme radicalization, unlike the other former socialist countries, where an

organized opposition had long existed and which, supported by the masses, came to power without bloodshed. We did not have such an organized opposition, only dissidents and isolated opponents. Nevertheless, perhaps the only form of organized opposition in Romania was our group of generals, who were interested in overthrowing Ceausescu's clique by force, and the group of six party veterans who sent the famous letter in June 1989.

[BARICADA] How do you explain the letter of the six, what was its purpose?

[Kostyali] I think that theirs was an honest act. I, too, who did not agree with Ceausescu and with the party (which had long since ceased being a communist party having been completely confiscated by the Ceausescu clan) had thought of doing something like that. We were prevented from doing it by the mentality in which we had been raised, namely not to ask for help from our "adversaries," i.e., from the Western countries. It was, of course, a mistake. We did ask the Soviets for help, but they did not respond on the grounds that they were not "getting involved." So that is how the letter of the six came to be. A pity that they did not have support from others. At the time I immediately got in touch with Iliescu, through Militaru, meaning for us to write a letter, too, but nothing came of it.

[BARICADA] How do you explain the fact that Iliescu did not publicly take a position against Ceausescu before 22 December 1989?

[Kostyali] Considering the legend previously woven around him as Ceausescu's presumptive heir, Iliescu should long have done something! He should have long ago taken a bold and honest attitude. In fact he is a timorous man and that explains everything. Including the fact that he, Iliescu, was one of the core members who slowed down the organization of the plot against Ceausescu. Iliescu and his friend Magureanu were continuously pulling us back with statements like: "It is not the right time yet," "the circle is closing around those under suspicion," "we have information that..." and all kinds of similar stories. He is a cowardly man who just waited for a favorable moment, and his friend Magureanu fabricated a "dissident myth" for him. Some dissident...who was the first secretary for Iasi County!

[BARICADA] What was Virgil Magureanu's position before 22 December 1989?

[Kostyali] I do not have any written or oral evidence, but maybe some day I will have witnesses and then I will be able to prove what I am saying; it is my firm deduction that Magureanu was continuously, up to 22 December 1989, an active member of the disinformation directorate of the Securitate. In other words, he was a double agent! I will have proof of it when certain Securitate members, currently under arrest, will lose their fear and will begin to talk. The existence alone of this phantom group of Securitate members who wanted to "overthrow" Ceausescu goes to prove what I say. Magureanu

was the "initiator" of that "group." What is more, in 1989 Brucan was sort of under house "arrest" in Damaroaia (it was not some "hut," but a respectable house). Militia and securitate men stood at the corners and stopped visitors from going in. But who do you think showed up at Silviu Brucan's around the beginning of December 1989 with a bottle of wine under his arm? Magureanu!

[BARICADA] What do you think of Magureanu's role after 22 December 1989?

[Kostyali] Unfortunately, Magureanu is the evil spirit in the current government team. That is not only because of his character, but also because of other reasons. First, he is obligated to his former Securitate colleagues, whom he restored to their positions. They were, of course, rotated, there have been some changes, now they cannot allow themselves the same arrogance and impertinence as in the past. So they protect each other. He has an utterly nefarious influence on Iliescu. Iliescu himself admitted that he is susceptible to influence. Susceptible is actually too little said about Iliescu. He is cowardly, as he demonstrated on 12 January 1990 when he gave in to mass pressure and outlawed a party; in other words, he decreed the first antidemocratic act after 22 December 1989. That party had a right to exist, it is not banned in any Western country. Then he reconsidered; countless times he showed this kind of ambiguous attitude and repeated reconsiderations. Of course such a character can be manipulated from behind the scenes, especially by this Magureanu, who is one of Iliescu's older friends. I am convinced that Magureanu bears most of the responsibility for the 13-15 June events in Targu Mures.

[BARICADA] Do you not think that he was actually the major organizer of those events?

[Kostyali] Yes, yes, that is exactly what I meant to say! Magureanu was the main organizer! Such ambiguous, unclear, and tortuous ideas could only be brewed in his brain.

[BARICADA] What do you think of the role of the Securitate in Romania's present life?

[Kostyali] In order to answer that question I must first say that in our plan of measures about immediately overthrowing Ceausescu's clique, our first measure was the complete elimination of the Securitate. We were planning to publish the list of its members, unmask its purposes, etc. Of course, a country must have a special body in charge of its national security. But the way in which the New Power dealt with the issue of security can be described in one word: lamentably! First of all, they put the entire Securitate under Army control, thereby doing Militaru a great disservice. The people's entire hatred of the Securitate implicitly spilled over to the Army and Militaru. Militaru, who is an honest man, began a wave of arrests immediately after 22 December 1989 among Securitate cadres and a few thousands of them were retired, but by then Magureanu had already appeared at Iliescu's side and he threw a wrench into the

purges. The outcome was that Militaru was removed from the Army leadership and Magureanu saved the Securitate. And very gradually the Securitate merely changed its name into the Romanian Intelligence Service. Militaru had already begun legal proceedings against the Army cadres who had opened fire in Timisoara. After he was removed, those who ordered the shooting got into positions, and by now General Stanculescu is the Army minister.

[BARICADA] What is currently the situation in the Romanian Army?

[Kostyal] Gen. Stanculescu has changed nothing other than the army uniforms (i.e., the outer markings). While in the beginning Stanculescu ostentatiously embraced CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army], once he came to power and attained his goals he simply eliminated that organization without any scruple. His masters (because he has his masters, too) told him to get rid of CADA, which he docilely did. Of course, I am not completely in agreement with CADA's activities, because on the one hand the Army is a ultracentralized organization, and on the other hand, to pursue the democratization of the Army while we do not yet have real democracy in the civil society, is nonsense. The order of priorities for democratization must be carefully thought out; the country must be democratized first, then the Army. So, initially Stanculescu used CADA, then he discarded it. You should not expect miracles from the democratization of the Army. You see the difficulties we have with the democratization of the country. When a parliament is dominated by a heavy majority (I am not talking about the low intellectual level of the Parliament members, because democracy must of course be learned, all of us have to learn it), things cannot go well. Democracy will remain at a standstill in our country as long as we continue to have ambiguous situations and convulsions like this artificially created problem about the minorities. We have street convulsions, workers movements, extraparlimentary movements, and trade union movements, so in such conditions it is very difficult to begin democratizing an ultracentralized body such as the Army.

Analysis of Current Brands of Nationalism

91BA0490B Bucharest "22" in Romanian
22 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Victor Giosan: "The Ethos of Nationalism"]

[Text] The Bucharest incursion by Vatra Romaneasca members revealed one interesting aspect: The immediate access they had to the authorities, unlike other protesters and dissatisfied people who were refused such access for months on end. This prompt official reaction hints at the existence of a very discrete (but very obvious in Alba-Iulia on 1 December 1990) link between the government party and the Vatra Romaneasca organization, which claims to be the sole legitimate representative of 6 to 7 million Romanians in Transylvania.

What we must carefully consider is not so much this more or less dark link, but the implications of the violent protest read on Television that evening. VR [Vatra Romaneasca], together with a string of publications—beginning with the notorious ROMANIA MARE—made no secret of the "sacred mission" they arrogated to themselves: Romanian propaganda and spreading Romanian values. The ideology of this movement was never clearly spelled out, but its central pivot is easily noticeable: nationalism.

In a recent editorial in "22," Andrei Pippidi wrote that the nationalist ideology was made up of two historical elements and religion, from which a specific morality is derived and legitimized. The ethos of the nationalist political movement in its VR version was concisely and clearly summarized the same day by the leader of the organization, Senator Radu Ceantea in a radio interview: "Any national or political minority must submit to the national or political majority." At first sight this assertion is correct, but unfortunately only at a superficial level. The history of the past two centuries shows that from a political and institutional viewpoint, the efforts of the modern states have been aimed at building a democracy designed to protect the rights of the minority at its basic level, namely at the level of the individual. Human rights are about the guarantees granted to the individual to protect him against possible abuses by the state or the community (i.e., the majority) in the process of defending its own social and political status.

Nationalism does not think in terms of individuals or of interpersonal relations, which in fact it views as harmonious and nonconflictual. The collective is an amorphous totality of individuals with the same status, behavior, opinions, and ideas. Discussions are held only among large groups, among nations, whereby differences and specific values are continuously examined. A transition is thus made from the utopia of social collectivism (specific of the communist system) to the utopia of a national collective. In the first case we are dealing with a comprehensive, universal homogenization based on everyone's integration in a huge phantom workers class, itself a myth propagated by those who imagine man as a being with arms but no head.

In the second case the homogenization is strictly limited to the national context and is based on everyone's perfect integration in an unchanging and perennial community of language, traditions, and culture. Ideological pluralism and pluralism of interests is inconceivable, and any conflicts or contradictions are thus erased. As in the case of social collectivism, this is a model describing a harmonious and homogenous social body.

This ideology, presented more implicitly than explicitly, has its roots in the sociological theory of organic development based on the generative matrix of our specific traditions and the model of the old primitive Christian communities. The prototype used by the theory of organic development (which today claims to

have been transformed into a philosophical current of the value and prestige of German idealism under the name of Romanian organic realism), is the peasant collectivity which gave birth to the popular Romanians mentioned by Nicolae Iorga. This is a relatively small, specifically rural community almost completely integrated in the natural, cosmic cycle of its preponderant occupation: agriculture. Time is very dilated and almost stripped of historical significance, a time of natural processes, a "fruitful" time in Constantin Noica's terminology. Such a community circulates a limited volume of information and knowledge, and lacks the very social structures capable of generating new knowledge. The social organization focuses on the collective, because the fundamental objective is survival. This does not refer to mere physical survival, but to the entire body of collective tradition, which, however, must not be expanded: any novelties are, if not (a priori) rejected, then achieved and accepted with extreme difficulty. To use a Marxist economic category, this is a reproduction that integrates [the individual] in the community and through it in the cycle of nature. Social and individual differences are minimal and unimportant in relation to the solidarity that unites everyone in their precarious existence. In sum, this kind of social model perfectly meets the aspirations of a nationalist ideology: homogeneity, harmony, absence of conflict, and autarky with extremely slow, almost imperceptible social and technological changes.

The question though is whether such a community still exists or can still exist.

In Western Europe its dissolution started at the beginning of the first agrarian and technological revolution in the 11th and 12th centuries, while in the Romanian principalities the process came much later and much more slowly, but it nevertheless started at the latest in the 16th century. The transition from a rural to a urban society and from an oral to a written culture sped up time and took it out of its purely cosmic significance and into an "orderly" time generator of history and culture. The volume of information and knowledge created, circulated, and preserved increased significantly thanks to the emergence of specific social structures that led to the contemporary explosion of human creativity. This creativity, however, is the product of the individual placed in a social context characterized by heterogeneity, ideological pluralism, and a contradictory and self-generated pluralism of interests. Could we return from this social context and these structures, which incorporated Romania almost two centuries ago, to a uniform and homogenizing community spirit opposed to individual differences?

In connection with the role played by the Orthodox religion in crystallizing the nationalist ideology, we must stress the perfect synchronization of its theoretical intervention with the model presented above of the organic development and of its basic structure, the peasant community. The absence of dogmatic and theological development of the Romanian Orthodox Church reflects

its anchoring in the cultural realities of the Christianity of the first millenium and its failure to adhere to the new socioeconomic structures (new means almost 200 years). The Church limited itself to "helping" the individual integrate in the cosmic rythm (hence Lucian Blaga's concept of the cosmic Christianity specific of the Romanian culture) and wait for the salvation bound to come sooner or later. The Romanian Orthodox religion limited itself to trying to preserve the external form of a type of religiosity divorced from the "new" socioeconomic context. This also explains the passive and partially collaborationist role of the church in the past 45 years, as well as the embarrassing spectacle of countless services and prayers offered at every crossroad in the past year without any echo in the souls of the participants.

We thus come to another particularly interesting fact: The nationalist ideology and propaganda take over and continue the old "schizoid" split of the "new man" of a communist type into an official man using the permissible language and rhetoric on the one hand, and on the other the real man suffocating into an increasingly smaller private space and stifled by lies and misery. In the case of nationalism we find the demagogical rhetoric of fatherland, people, sacred history, ancestral language, national heroes who sacrificed their lives, permanently threatened territorial integrity, etc., etc., all of which belong to the public man, who this time, however, is no longer forced to use it, and the same man who steals, cons, lies, and peddles influence. In the case of professional propagandists and ideologists (see the almost pathological case of C.V. Tudor), this separation and the contradiction that encompasses it is conscious, but it represents a source of political or economic power. What moral can lie within C.V. Tudor, who on one page writes about Transylvania's first saint and Horea's tortures, while on the other page he writes trivial gossip about former dissidents like Doina Cornea, whom he describes as a "drunken chicken with hormonal imbalances," or VR's attitude as presented on television by one of its leaders, Professor Ion Coja, immediately after the embarrassing 1 December demonstration in Alba Iulia, namely that the organization will always side with the party in power regardless of who it may be (in other words, now they boo the liberal and peasant leaders, but in a few years time they may well boo the FSN [National Salvation Front] leaders). For the overwhelming majority of Romanian national propagandists, the events of December 1989 marked only a moment of confusion, after which they immediately switched masters, the essential for them being to be close to the power that be.

The other category, the great majority, is however not conscious of this split between nationalist rhetoric and the ethos of daily life; all of us were raised and educated in the habit of saying one thing and doing another. The specifically Romanian "resourcefulness" may be the worst thing we inherited from the old regime: that mentality that creates an enormous network of complicities so that no one is even relatively clean and everyone

tends to bow their necks and bend their backbones. Times of profound crisis such as the present cannot be overcome without a critical analysis of the realities and mentalities inside and around us. This, however, is something very difficult and involves taking our personal fate in our own hands, a habit from which socialism has broken us. So it is easier to keep seeing a foreign enemy, someone other than ourselves, who derails our efforts of development toward modernity and prosperity, rather than to search the reasons for failure in our own ideas, prejudices, lies, and cowardice.

'Dangerous' Language in Constitutional Theses

91BA0483A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 26 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Florin Gabriel Marculescu: "Good Faith and Our Rights"]

[Text] At the end of the third section of Chapter II (Citizens' Rights, Freedoms and Obligations) of the Constitutional Theses, there is a strange text that attracted our attention almost without our wanting it to. It reads: "As holders of the constitutional rights and freedoms, the citizens are obligated to exercise them in good faith." It is a pointless and also dangerous text because it is intended, in our opinion, as a subtle limitation of our basic rights and freedoms right from the start. The same effect is also perseveringly pursued when the constitutional order is invoked, often quite pointlessly, within the theses. It is true of another thesis, equally absurd, to the effect that the freedom of our opinions stops at the dreaded and sacrosanct constitutional order. But let us return to our good faith—not to the everyday one, so threadbare and devalued by the well-known cliché "men in good faith," but to the concept expressed in legal standards. In its strictly legal sense, the concept was circulated back in Roman times and is still present in the standards of civil law in our country and elsewhere. For example, it is the conviction of a possessor that he has a right of ownership over his possessions if the right was acquired on terms that he does not know are invalid, because, of course, he is in good faith. Good faith also entered into international law. Grotius, in his famous work "De Jure Belli et Pacis," elevated it to the rank of general principles on which the interpretation of treaties is based. In the latter field, the technical dictionaries tell us that we are to interpret good faith as sincerity and fidelity in fulfilling the obligations and exercising the rights flowing from international agreements in strict conformity with their contents and purposes. We also find good faith in Article 2 of the UN Charter. There is no need to call further attention to the distortions and slips that can be caused by the obvious fragility of this concept in the world where, to the posthumous disappointment of our great Titulescu, the right of force and not the right of law still comes first.

Shifted now, and, if we are not mistaken, for the very first time, to the ground of our constitutional provisions

in course of preparation, the use of the concept to which we are referring seems to us not only completely unjustified, but also downright dangerous, as we said. It is dangerous because it deliberately throws us into the realm of the arbitrary. It goes without saying that any individual excesses are ultimately sanctioned by public morality, or even by social morality if they are extremely dangerous, by incurring legal prosecution. Those things are well known and too obvious to dwell upon any further. But we want to call attention to the fact that introduction of the concept of good faith into the area of exercise of the rights and freedoms of the individual is liable to create a dark and practically uncontrollable intermediate area within which the power will be able to exploit its unrestricted "freedom" to obstruct our rights, this time in bad faith. And then, is there a scale of good faith? What is its measure? We realize there are some natural limitations that may intervene in the exercise of the basic rights and freedoms, decreed with all the necessary precision and with no deviation from the respective provisions of international law. As the concept in question is introduced into our constitutional principles, it can give rise to abusive interpretations at any time. And—pardon our suspicion—we think that was intended. There are sufficient reasons why we are venturing to propose elimination of the whole cited thesis to the Constituent Assembly. Unfortunately, it is a thesis adopted against the background of a disappointing superficiality that has become the dominant note of the discussions within the Constituent Assembly. The attempt to limit our rights through the use of an unstable and inadequate concept of international law is intolerable.

Minister of Environment Interviewed

91BA0476A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
5 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Environment Minister Valeriu Eugen Pop; place and date not given]

[Text] [ADEVARUL] How did the organizational structure of the Environment Ministry develop as a new body of the executive power and at what stage is it now?

[Pop] Initially it was constituted by the merger of three bodies: the National Council for Waters, the Ministry of Silviculture, and the Commission for Environmental Protection, to which the Nuclear Control Commission was later added. Under the provisional government it was only a simple merger. After 1 July it was streamlined, which among other things involved a marked drop in the number of personnel and the almost complete replacement of the managerial cadres. After the establishment of autonomous managements and commercial associations, the economic functions of the Ministry were almost completely eliminated; in the future we will concentrate exclusively on the basic issues of environmental protection and conservation and on representing the interests of the state in specific areas.

Environmental monitoring and protection agencies have been established in each county and in Bucharest. They are staffed with specialists and have the necessary laboratories to fulfill the functions implied in their title.

The recently established Institute of Environmental Research and Engineering has the mission to hammer out a general strategy and studies of a general and interdisciplinary impact in this domain. It will also represent our advisory forum for all technical, technological, and construction solutions, etc., whether they be suggested by foreign or Romanian investors.

[ADEVARUL] Once the organizational structures were determined, what other priorities did the Environmental Ministry have?

[Pop] It is difficult to pick out priorities in an area so sensitive and so rife with countless urgent requirements throughout the country. Nevertheless, I want to mention with satisfaction that the necessary legislation has been drafted and is now under debate and consultation by governmental and nongovernmental bodies. I am referring to the environment bill, the water bill, the forestry code, the bill on hunting, and other decisions and measures. In order to ensure that the bills become immediately operational we focused on comprehensive indexes for assessing the situation, on the basis of which we can calculate regional pollution indexes.

However, I think that the absolute priority is education. We are all pollutants, but we expect others to come and clean up after us. Unfortunately, we are still doing too little in the area of education—both the Ministry and the other factors which can make a useful contribution. I am referring to schools, television, the press in general, ecological movements and bodies, and those responsible for recycling.

[ADEVARUL] European integration is becoming an increasingly topical subject. How does the Environmental Ministry perceive it?

[Pop] Before securing the status of a special guest at the European Council, Romania enjoyed full rights it tackling matters concerning the protection of forestry ecosystems. Our country's position, which was reasserted on the occasion of the signing of the Strasbourg declaration last December, gained unanimous appreciation and I think that it made a certain contribution to crystalizing an opinion favorable to us in the European Parliament.

One of our highly topical problems now that we have joined many international conventions and treaties in the area of environmental pollution is to implement their principles in practice; such actions can also help overcome some of our political isolation. We have entered into many cooperation ventures with governmental and nongovernmental bodies and reputable foreign firms, we are included in the PHARE program of assistance from industrialized countries, and this year we expect an unprecedented increase in efforts to help Romania.

[ADEVARUL] Going back to our strictly local problems, please allow me a rather indiscrete question: Do you also have reasons for dissatisfaction?

[Pop] A lot, unfortunately! The greatest—probably shared by other members of the government team—is that although we were elected by a majority of the people, we often feel isolated, being targeted for continual criticism that is only rarely accompanied by constructive, viable proposals or alternatives. In the area of ecology, in the eight months since the formation of the government we never received any such proposal from any political group. On the other hand, we "enjoyed" all kinds of criticism based on considerations that were unrealistic in the best case. Without financial resources matching the needs (another reason of dissatisfaction), without sufficient apparatus and equipment, but haunted by the specter of a social impact of the measures required that may exceed the ecological impact, being in charge of the environment is no easy matter. I am also unhappy about the fact that business enterprises still expect subsidies from the public budget instead of using their own forces to deal with purification problems; too many people prefer to organize into autonomous managements rather than commercial associations.

The slogan, "Never mind, it's OK," is still much in use, which means that mentalities did not change overnight and that we have not overcome our condition as coparticipants in the old familiar vices. Gradually, however, we must step away from the past more quickly. Through outside contacts and the technical problems that need to be solved I am positive that we will manage to become genuine professionals and to hammer out the concepts and directions that will help us fulfill our mission.

New Timis County Police Chief Interviewed

91BA0475A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
15 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Vasile Coporan, Timis County police chief, by Mugurel Radulescu; place and date not given]

[Text] After the much disputed replacement of the chief of police of Timis County, we thought it natural to ask Colonel Vasile Coporan, the new holder of that position, for an interview, which may be the absolutely first of its kind.

[Radulescu] Colonel, please remind us in a few words of the conditions in which you acquired your post and replaced Colonel Viorel Oancea.

[Coporan] I want to point out that I have nothing to do with Colonel Oancea's release. I can say that the mood among the troops was not good and that they were inefficient in combating crime. Many police cadres challenged him on the measures taken and for lack of professionalism. Also, there were many complaints and files in which the perpetrators were never identified. Those were the main reasons for which my predecessor was replaced.

[Radulescu] What measures did you take to reduce crime?

[Coporan] Our first concern was to create an appropriate working spirit among the cadres. We realized that only in such conditions could we restore the prestige of the police. After reexamining the operational situation in the country from a police viewpoint, we established several directions of action. We focused on efficiently using the police forces both during the day and at night wherever conditions were propitious to crimes. We then organized several small-scale raids and controls in markets, fairs, in the streets, and in other places likely to be frequented by persons engaging in illegal activities. These raids allowed us to apprehend the authors of thefts and burglaries, as well as black marketeers, foreign currency traffickers, and gamblers.

[Radulescu] Still, foreign money continues to be exchanged in the middle of town, in front of the Continental Hotel...

[Coporan] Timisoara is teeming with people who are not from here engaged in illegal activities, both for themselves and on behalf of others. There are very many "private" [entrepreneurs] who change their money through professional traffickers. The present laws are not very effective for combating this kind of crime. I think that this aspect must be examined by the competent bodies for the purpose of issuing normative acts appropriate to the currently prevailing situation.

[Radulescu] What are your relations with the political parties and organizations in the county? What should be the attitude of a police chief in the conditions of a state of law?

[Coporan] I want to stress that, as is known, the police does not engage in politics and does not allow itself to be swayed by any pressure from political or apolitical organizations. We will show the same understanding attitude toward all the parties when their interests require police assistance. In fact, I have scheduled meetings with representatives of all the parties in Timisoara in order to jointly decide on methods to prevent and combat antisocial activities that may have a negative impact on their activities.

[Radulescu] How will the Timisoara police react to meetings and demonstrations? We know that they did not all end peacefully.

[Coporan] We are obligated by law to participate in meetings and demonstrations, proceeding from the premise that we must cooperate with the organizers in order to ensure orderly demonstrations. We will avoid the use of force as much as possible and we certainly will not take measures against those invited to or participating in meetings. I believe that they have the same interests as we do, namely to ensure order and avoid incidents. Force will be used only to remove possible inciters and provocations.

[Radulescu] What do you view as normal relations between the police and the citizenry?

[Coporan] The police is in the midst of changing its attitude toward the citizens. On the one hand we are taking steps to reshuffle the troops, while on the other we have to ensure training appropriate to the new social changes, whereby we emphasize faultless behavior in work-related contacts. We hope that for their part the citizens will show understanding, and we want to assure them that all our activities are aimed at defending their rights and interests. The press should perhaps put greater stress on educating the readers in a spirit of respect for truth, law, and justice. We also believe it would be desirable to persuade the legislative bodies to issue the normative acts required by the current situation and the antisocial behavior we have to confront.

YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian People's Party on Crisis Solution

91BA0551B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
12 Apr 91 p 9

[Article consisting of a position paper of the Croatian People's Party [HNS], issued by the presidium of that party and signed by its president, Prof. Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar: "Readiness for Defense Does Not Increase but Diminishes the Threat of Civil War"]

[Text]

The Situation and Assessments

1. Croatia, which threatens no one, is threatened.

The republic has already been cut into pieces, its authority is contested over an ever greater area, communications are being interrupted, and economic functions are grinding to a halt. The imperial policy of expansionist Serbia, combined with the terrorist groups of Serbs in Croatia and with the ever greater involvement of the JPA [Yugoslav People's Army], is trying to take from the Croat people the right to their own state and to self-determination.

The escalation of aggression threatens to ignite the spark of a tragic civil war.

2. The incomplete state of a political strategy for defense of Croatia's sovereignty, inconsistency in statements and actions, vacillation, and the harboring of illusions are making people disoriented, embittered because of being humiliated in their own homeland, and uncertain about what should be done. The passive resistance of Mahatma Gandhi was a strategy derived from specific conditions, while the Gandhism of present Croatian policy is a sign that there is no strategy.

3. The embittered demonstrations of citizens of Croatia occasioned by the beginning of the trial of Minister Martin Speglj and others expressed the immense energy

of the people and its determination to oppose the carving up of the homeland and its humiliation. That energy should be directed toward organized preparations for defense by any aggressor because otherwise it could drain off into anarchical and unproductive expressions of rebellion and despair.

4. The activities of JPA units in Croatia are not "summer exercises" at all, but rather people rightly perceive them as a silent occupation. Is the removal of the Croatian flag on Croatian soil also a part of military exercises? They are hardening bridgeheads which the terrorists of expansionist Serbia are broadening over the territory of Croatia and thereby giving legitimacy to establishment of a second Serbian state on Croatian soil.

5. The trial of General Martin Spegelj, Croatian minister of defense, and the others, only because, consistent with the Croatian constitutional system and decisions of the Croatian Assembly and government, they organized and prepared Croatia's defense, is actually a trial of Croatia and its democracy.

6. The alleged role of the JPA as a pacifier in Croatia is being refuted every day and in many places. Its true nature is manifested in its passivity toward the authentically terroristic misdeeds, combined at the same time with political arbitration which prevents even peaceful expression of disagreement with the policy of the leaders of the illegal Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina and the desire to work (the case of the workers in Plitvice); in the distribution of arms to paramilitary Chetnik detachments, while at the same time the legally elected minister of the government of Croatia responsible for its defense is being tried, and so on.

7. There is no reason to believe that the JPA will not interfere in the resolution of the governmental and political crisis and that it will not think of bringing down the legally elected government in Croatia. Twice in the past the JPA has intervened in Croatia, always to the detriment of its sovereignty. The naivete of such beliefs has been especially manifest since adoption of the conclusion of the SFRY Presidency on 25 January of this year, which opened the door to the arrests in Virovitica and the charges filed against Minister Spegelj.

8. In its resolutions on 25 January and 31 March of this year, the SFRY Presidency contested the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia in that it allowed the military courts to try civilians in Croatia, put the legal government of Croatia on a par with terrorist detachments, and asserted demands which can be considered blackmail.

Proposals of the HNS [Croatian People's Party]

9. Croatia must strive for a peaceful and democratic solution of the crisis, but must also bear in mind that it is dealing with forces that do not recognize the power of argument, but only the argument of force. History teaches us that defensiveness, hesitation, and continuous appeasement only encourage and increase the appetites of the aggressor. Croatia must say a clear "no" to the

encroachment on its sovereignty and territory and must prepare for nationwide defense because any delay in this respect increases rather than diminishes the danger that a civil war will break out.

10. In these fateful moments, we propose an emergency and if necessary permanent session of the Croatian Assembly, which has the greatest authority to formulate the policy of the Croatian state. There is no more legitimate institution in Croatia than the Assembly, and no one can offer greater authenticity and negotiating power to the representatives of Croatia who are taking part in the talks to resolve the crisis in the country.

11. We propose that the Croatian Assembly demand of the SFRY Presidency that the Army return to its garrisons and not interfere in internal life in Croatia; that the arms of Croatian Territorial Defense that were taken away be returned; otherwise, they could be used to arm the terrorists, that is, for the fight against the Croatian people.

We propose that the Croatian Assembly adopt a decision to terminate financing of the JPA until the demand above is met.

12. We propose that the Croatian Assembly take the initiative for recruits to do their military service only in their own republic.

13. The police forces of Croatia and their reserve corps are at this moment the only armed force in Croatia. However, they have been trained, armed, and intended for other tasks. Only military units can effectively defend Croatia. We believe that this is the last moment for Croatia to urgently undertake to build its own nationwide defense system, with Territorial Defense as its backbone.

14. On the basis of the possibilities that exist in constitutional law, we propose that Croatia immediately appoint the commander and staff for Territorial Defense with the task of undertaking revitalization of Territorial Defense units that have been formed and trained and which could become the core of the Croatian Armed Forces.

15. The interparty committees for national protection raise many doubts. The Gandhist sacrificing of the people, who would go out in front of the tanks unarmed, is not a good idea: We are too small a people for something like that, and we are also dealing with opponents who "are not English" and do not have many scruples. We also feel that organizing national protection is not the business of the political parties, but the duty of the bodies of government, while the parties could play a significant role in the political mobilization of the citizenry.

For all these reasons, we propose formation of unarmed voluntary units of national protection as an expression of the determination of the people to defend their homeland by every means. In no case should this be an army

organized by political parties, regardless of whether it is a question of one party or several, so that it would not be used in the struggle for power under certain other circumstances.

16. The voluntary units should be manned first with individuals who have gone through military training. They would be organized and trained so that as soon as they obtain arms they can, if necessary become members of the republic army. The formation and drilling of such units would be the task of Territorial Defense, which is professionally equipped for this job.

17. Territorial Defense, the voluntary detachments, and auxiliary units would form the backbone of the nationwide defense of Croatia—the only possibility of defending our freedom and sovereignty effectively and in an organized manner.

No one in Croatia who respects his homeland has reasons to be suspicious of the conception we have set forth. Non-Croats—Serbs and others—who constitute a majority of the population in the areas where they live, would also have the greatest representation in the nationwide defense units and in the command personnel.

One of the fundamental preconditions for successful organization of nationwide defense is for this entire socially important job to emerge from the unnecessary secretiveness—for it to be public and subject to public scrutiny. Along with all the other reasons, the complete transparency of these matters would encourage a greater commitment of the resources of individuals, the Croatian emigre community, and others for the training and equipping of the units. There are no reasons whatsoever why sovereign Croatia should not legalize its right to organize and arm its own defense, which is not only its democratic right, but also its obligation.

18. We propose that the government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs guarantee control of Croatian borders, especially on the rivers across which arms for the terrorists are arriving from Serbia.

19. We call upon the Croatian authorities to urgently guarantee all civil and human rights to Croats in the area of the so-called Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina, who have been utterly deprived of their rights and exposed to various forms of mistreatment. Verbal and moral support is no longer enough for them.

Serbia's Plan To Eliminate Borders of Provinces *91BA0551A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian* *12 Apr 91 p 7*

[Article by Toma Milic: "Serbia With 19 Districts and Belgrade"]

[Text] The legislative project concerning territorial organization of the Republic of Serbia and local self-government, which is being prepared by the Ministry of

Justice and the Republic Bureau for Public Administration, is just now taking the form of a legislative bill and is coming closer and closer to proceedings in the Assembly. Although the Government of Serbia has not yet taken a position concerning it, the draft of the law has already aroused great public interest. People are naturally not indifferent as to whether or not they will have an opstina, whether they will belong to Belgrade, Nis, or Kraljevo, whether the districts will be something new or will inherit the interopstina regional communities.

There are, then, many questions. Answers to some of them are becoming discernible even now, but for others the experts are proposing alternative solutions. Judging by the debates to date, the view prevails among specialists that the territorial organization of Serbia must adapt to the new Constitution. The territory will be uniform and will be divided into 19 districts—excluding Belgrade.

Highly Autonomous Opstinas

As for Belgrade, the assessment is that all the ministries will have their headquarters there and that it is most efficient for the ministries to handle affairs pertaining to the territory of the city of Belgrade through detached units of those ministries. There is an innovation in the proposal that Pancevo Opstina be attached to Belgrade. However, there is every prospect that the original idea of "dropping" the opstinas of Mladenovac and Lazarevac from the Belgrade region will be rejected and they will remain in the Belgrade region.

The largest public reaction is being evoked by the proposed division into districts and opstinas. As for the districts, here every illusion should be removed. The districts have no elements of territorial organization at all and they should not be seized upon; they perform central-republic functions, the specialists in constitutional matters say. The districts have practically no power whatsoever, by contrast with the interopstina regional units we have had up to now and which will be abolished by this bill. The elements of territorial organization, then, are the opstinas, the provinces, and the city of Belgrade.

The district will not be headed, as people in some places would have liked, by "bans," but by secretaries or chiefs of the district, with very limited independence. The districts are "centers of the republic government." As for the opstinas, what is new here is that they will not be standardized as they have been up to now. Depending on their geographic, economic, and other specific position, the republic will, in a separate law, transfer obligations to them, but they will also have great autonomy of their own.

The new territorial organization has not been completed, all the ideas and proposals are circulating. But the trouble is that the government and the Serbian National Assembly are preoccupied with other business, and this bill has not yet begun the parliamentary procedure. But

the people in the Republic Bureau for Public Administration say that those proceedings will begin soon, and all the ideas and proposals will be accessible to the public. At this point, much of that is being guessed at and politicized in certain milieux, without good reason. The essential thing is that the new territorial division is adapted to the economic, geographic, traditional, and other conditions under which the citizens live.

What is important to the public and can at this point be "extracted" from what the specialists say and from the papers on which they are working, is the proposal that the republic be divided into the following districts (okrugs): The seat of the Banat District would be Zrenjanin, Novi Sad for the Backa District, Pozarevac for Branicevo, Leskovac for Jablanica, Valjevo for Kolubara, Pristina for Kosovo, Pirot for Luzica, Sabac for Macva, Prizren for Metohija, Titovo Uzice for Milesevo, Vranje for Pcinj, Krusevac for Rasin, Novi Pazar for Raska, Smederevo for the Smederevo District, Sremska Mitrovica for the Srem District, Kraljevo for Studenica, Zajecar for Timok, Nis for Toplica, and Kragujevac for the Sumadija District.

Without Provincial Borders

One of the most important innovations is that the borders of the provinces in the future territorial division will not coincide with the borders of the districts. It is new, for example, that Pancevo will belong to Belgrade and the Kosovo opstinas of Gnjilane, Kosovska Kamenica, and Vitina to the Pcinj District (Vranje). The opstinas of Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic would be annexed to the Raska District (Novi Pazar), and the Kosovo Opstina of Podujevo would belong to the Toplica District (Nis). The demand of the Kostolac (Pozarevac) Local Community to become an opstina has not been honored as yet.

There are still quite a few dilemmas and quandaries among the specialists. This is one of them: Which settlements should be treated as cities and on the basis of what criterion, especially since the new Serbian Constitution has not defined the jurisdiction of the cities, but leaves this to city charters? At the same time, the Constitution states that certain opstinas may by law be "established as cities containing two or more opstinas." This would seem to be a disintegrative component which should be quickly eliminated. For now, only Novi Sad and Nis are mentioned as cities in the proposed version of the law. The territory of Belgrade has remained outside the division of the republic into districts. There is a proposal that the city of Belgrade become the 20th district.

There is another dilemma, it seems, in that it is still not known with certainty who is supposed to initiate public discussion of this bill because this has not been envisaged by the operating procedure of the Serbian National Assembly, and the Government of Serbia still has not adopted its operating procedure. All that is reliably known is that the government is the sponsor of the law.

There obviously are many new proposals and alternatives, but also dilemmas. Nevertheless, the bill is more or less ready and the government of Serbia is to take a position on it as soon as possible, which would be followed by that of the Serbian National Assembly. Then the delegates will certainly consult with their constituents concerning the entire bill. Nothing should be prejudiced until that point is reached.

Debate Over Markovic's Future Reviewed

91BA0502A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
7 Apr 91 p 5

[Article by Zivko Gruden: "FEC [Federal Executive Council] President in a Secret Pac(t)kage"]

[Text] Was a Croato-Serbian agreement bringing down President of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] Markovic reached on 25 March in Karadjordjevo? Since announcement of the communique on the meeting of the two leaders, Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic "in the border area between the two republics," and up to the present day, hundreds of newspaper articles and columns have been written about that "agreement," "transaction," or "conspiracy," which, except for several of the first ones, do not deal with the question of the reliability of that report, but mostly with the motives that brought the two leaders together against Markovic and about their chances of bringing about what they have in mind.

What makes the newspapermen so certain that the private talks confined to the two men in the well-known hunting preserve brought an agreement to end Markovic's tenure soon? There is no doubt that many felt a professional urge as soon as they read the part of the communique saying that the talk of the two leaders was "conducted in an effort to...examine decisions and proposals such as the proposal of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia, concerning changes in the operation and makeup of the Federal Executive Council in the transitional period, in the interest of protecting the country against economic collapse." A day or two later, Stipe Mesic gave an interview to the U.S. wire service AP in which he predicted that Markovic might even leave before 15 May because of the increased pressures of Serbia. The summit meeting in Split does more to confirm than to refute the agreement in Karadjordjevo: The Croatian president, answering an explicit question, used wording to the effect that "nowhere has it been stated that I accepted any changes, least of all in response to the pressures of Serbia," but that "the issue of the position toward that federal government is being raised in Croatia as well," and his colleague from Serbia presented once again his extremely unfavorable assessments of the policy of the Markovic government. And, above all else, at precisely the moment of the first meeting of the six in Split, Warren Zimmermann, U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, brought to Ante Markovic the letter from George Bush in which the U.S. President expressed support and admiration.

The Secrets of Karadjordjevo

The average newspaper reader probably did not find a hint of Markovic's demise in the communique on the Tudjman-Milosevic talks. Professional analysts, however, had to be struck by the wording about "changes in the makeup of the FEC" in order to "protect the country against economic collapse." Was the reference perhaps to some of Markovic's ministers? But is it possible to pin on some minister the blame for the "country's economic collapse"? For that matter, would such serious words be resorted to, and would the two leaders meet secretly on behalf of some ordinary reshuffling of the cabinet? To be sure, as Milosevic himself remarked in the press conference in Split, the meeting in Karadjordjevo was not secret: A communique concerning it was issued, as is the usual case. Nevertheless, it is quite unusual for the place of a meeting to be kept secret, and the wording "border area" enveloped it in a veil of mystery and stirred up guessing to the effect that some deals were concluded at it that were not everyday affairs.

The ice was broken by BORBA, "a newspaper close to the government," the very next day after publication of the communique concerning the meeting. Under the headline "Bargaining in Karadjordjevo," the newspaper wrote that it had "learned unofficially" that Franjo Tudjman had accepted Serbia's demand to remove Ante Markovic and in return obtained Milosevic's consent to resolve the case of Knin in keeping with the Croatian Constitution. It was only a day or two after the meeting that the newspaper, then, discovered its secret location (in Split, Milosevic confirmed that it had not been mistaken), and that also increased the degree of authenticity of its other discoveries, which, to be sure, have not been explicitly confirmed, but neither have they been explicitly denied. However, the extremely firm and arrogant positions which the president of Serbia displayed in Split, and certainly the events which followed, dispelled in an instant all the guesses about a great pact concluded in Karadjordjevo. All except one—the one about Markovic. It is now obvious, many have written, that Tudjman and Milosevic were unable to agree on anything except that Markovic should be brought down. Others stuck with the theory of a more extensive pac(t)age, which, however, had all fallen apart when Markovic dropped out of it because of the Bush letter.

What would be at the bottom of this alleged alliance? There are no appreciable differences in answers to that question among analysts of events on our political and economic scene, from DELO to NOVA MAKEDONIJA. Boris Jez was one of the first, even before the summit meeting in Split, to come out with a column entitled "Let Ante Hang," published in DELO of Ljubljana. According to him, Milosevic certainly wants to gain control over the captain's bridge of the federal government because he sees no other salvation for the Serbian economy except to print money, and he will not be able to go on forever feeding the hungry masses with hatred toward the Croats. If Tudjman consented to that, with all the risk that the new FEC president will be concerned

first about Serbian stomachs, this, according to Jez, obviously means that he is also very interested in shipments from the printing plant in Topcider, "which is in keeping with the new statist economic philosophy which has been dominant in Banski Dvori." Jez suspects that the partners also made other deals because "Tudjman would not sacrifice Markovic lightly, without consulting with the Slovenes in this connection." Expressing the assessment that Markovic "really has not been an ideal prime minister," Jez predicts that the new "interrepublic consensus economy promises only universal chaos."

Inflation as Salvation

OSLOBODJENJE and NOVA MAKEDONIJA and VJESNIK and DANAS and VREME also wrote to the effect that the two leaders are hungry for money to be printed, that is, for inflation, so that they could, to some extent, fill empty treasuries at least temporarily and postpone the moment of facing the truth and social dissatisfaction.

According to VREME, Milosevic and Tudjman came to Split in order to win the other participants in the summit meeting over to the removal of Markovic or to force him to weaken his present restrictive monetary policy. They did not succeed in that through the fault of George Bush, whose letter sent to Markovic "was a case of ideally precise diplomatic timing."

Although there is no agreement among the commentators on what the balance of power was during the debate of Markovic in the summit meeting in Split, they all mention that Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov were most resolute in opposing the shooting of the FEC president. BORBA was again the most complete in describing the positions of the others. Milosevic insisted most firmly on removing the FEC president, and he was joined by Bulatovic. Kucan's position was not explicit: He asked what in general was to be achieved by the removal, that is, by the resignation of the federal government, except that yet another political problem would be created. Tudjman, as the host, had the role of mediator and thereby the privilege of laying out his cards only at the end: Readers have not learned whether he revealed them more openly than in the press conference. According to OSLOBODJENJE of Sarajevo, the summit meeting in Split produced one essential thing: "A real attempt was made there to bring down Ante Markovic," and this was opposed by the leaders of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the others "were more or less in favor, but with cosmetic shades of difference." There were hints and announcement that the finale would be played at the second summit meeting in Belgrade; however, the host at that summit, Milosevic, told newsmen that that topic was not debated.

At Whose Expense?

The Macedonian and Bosnia-Herzegovinian media were the fiercest in criticism of the alleged Croato-Serbian

deal in Karadjordjevo, and they also presented some new details. Thus, OSLOBODJENJE in an editorial entitled "Adios, Ante," answered affirmatively the rhetorical question of whether Markovic "had already been bagged in the famous communist hunting preserve for officials' heads." The newspaper went on to forecast that Serbia would attempt to impose Jovic as FEC president, which would not succeed, but then it would consent to Dagmar Suster, but Ante Markovic, with his excellent connections in the world, has already been assured the place of FEC president or at least foreign minister of the Croatian government. But NEDELJA of Sarajevo writes that "it still is not clear who are all those who will pay the price of the deal in Karadjordjevo," but that it is clear that the two leaders agreed to bring down Markovic because they are aware that he is doing the most to threaten the policy which Markovic personifies: "Tudjman and Milosevic personify a policy which belongs to the 19th century, a policy of national programs and outmoded national states, while Markovic personifies a modern market-oriented policy." NOVA MAKEDONIJA, wondering what is hidden behind the intention of bringing down Markovic at any price, answers that some of the republic leaders "are in a panicky state of fear of a deepening of democratic processes in Yugoslavia."

For VECER of Maribor, it is debatable whether Slovenia should take part in bringing down Markovic, and DELO warns of the danger that the process of Croato-Serb detente, initiated behind the back of the FEC president, could continue behind the back of Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo.... According to Drago Buvac in SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, Milosevic and Tudjman were able to reach agreement easily on economic affairs because they are both threatened by a "social rebellion which cannot be put down otherwise than with new hyperinflation" (which Markovic does not allow), and according to Dimitrije Boarovo in DANAS, although it is not "simple to accept the assessment that the agreement in Karadjordjevo was quashed in Washington," Bush's message to Markovic on the day of the Split summit meeting provided indubitable evidence that the United States is "thinking seriously."

President Bush's letter to FEC President Markovic also moved POLITIKA to become involved in this debate, although it did not, of course, mention anywhere that there had been some agreement or deal in Karadjordjevo. The editorial comment of POLITIKA was actually only an elaboration of Milosevic's position concerning Bush's support to Markovic which he expressed in the press conference in Split. Bush's message to Markovic arrived, POLITIKA writes, at precisely the moment when "agreement about the necessity of questioning the positions of the present chairman of the FEC and his policy was spreading rapidly and widely" and it "interfered directly in our domestic political arena," "even when we had fallen lowest in our history, they never named our prime ministers from abroad," and so on, and so forth.

Explicit disbelief of the Croato-Serbian agreement to remove Markovic was expressed (only) in VECERNJI LIST.

"The participation of the president of Croatia in a plot against Markovic would not only be dishonest in view of the previous statements of support, but also politically inappropriate," writes Milan Jaycinovic and adds that it would be "unreasonable of the U.S. President to seek political support and cook up a plot against a man who today could go to the United States and be received the very next day by the U.S. President!"

What, then, is going to happen to Markovic? Will he last until 15 May? Will someone else put up with both the president of the Presidency (Mesic) and the president of the FEC (Markovic) both coming from Croatia? However that might be, the FEC president, if one is to believe the newsmen, is experiencing tumultuous days: Yesterday he was all but removed, today he is receiving compliments not only from the White House, but also from certain domestic houses as well.

Kucan's Credibility, Power Questioned

91BA0540B Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA
(supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 13-14 Apr 91 p 7

[Article by Steva Sicarov: "The Conflicts of the Paper Secession"]

[Text] Among the numerous questions related to the multi-lateral Yugoslav summit meeting, the most striking is certainly this elementary one: What credibility do the negotiators have? And that not in the sense of analyzing the political character of the individuals, at which the media have become past masters—in which Milosevic and Dr. Tudjman long ago built a tough image. Izetbegovic figures as a compromiser, and those who love to decipher political poses explain the appearance of the grimace on Kucan's face or his "blinking at the ceiling" in that sense which is more far-reaching, at least in its consequences. Put simply, to what extent are the agreements/disagreements of the six binding on the republics which they represent? Judging from the Slovenian political theater, one would say that this question is more than justified. After all, to whatever extent it has seemed to consumers of the daily ideological and political output of the mythology of the disintegration of Yugoslavia that in these performances Kucan is the one "who represents everything," and that the view of Slovenia over the 100 days which have passed since the plebiscite is well known, it is worth recalling the diversity of Slovenian parliamentarianism. We are referring here to a train of events over the last half year, which outside Slovenia tends to fall a bit into oblivion, but it unambiguously structures the position of Kucan as a negotiator.

Briefly, the point is that the opinion prevails in the broadest Slovenian public that the "dance is being led by Kucan's opponent in last year's elections, the DEMOS leader Dr. Joze Pucnik. Any layman will cite the arguments to back up this assertion:

- After the first months in which the parliament was getting things organized, Dr. Pucnik was the first to assert in public that the opposition was dragging its feet over adoption of the new constitution and that

Slovenia must first become an independent state and only then adopt a constitution.

- Then Dr. Pucnik emerged as the author of the idea of the plebiscite, which was unreservedly supported in DEMOS, and the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and Liberal Democratic Party participated after several day-and-night efforts at persuasion and negotiations, along with election concessions, under the threat of betrayal of the people, and the impression of a consensus among the parties was created.
- Less than 40 days have passed since the plebiscite when Dr. Pucnik again came forth with the thesis that Slovenia was slow in becoming independent, and in early February he announced that Slovenia was disassociating itself. The way in which he did this, that is, the fact that he was the first to present to the public the results of the multiparty agreement in the republic Presidency, unambiguously marked the DEMOS leader as the key figure in the most important decisions, both strategic and tactical.

At precisely the time of the plebiscitary mess, Kucan began to lose the credit he had gained previously as the sovereign helmsman between DEMOS' radical nationalism and the Charybdis of the communist past. The advocacy of a dual position, i.e., of a statehood that will not take the form of establishing the border on the Kupa and the Sutla, evoked sharp attacks from DEMOS' most extreme faction and also the unheard-of precedent in the Assembly, when "Kucan's" programmatic speech on the road to independence was stricken from the minutes.

That, however, was only the first sign of the "loss of sovereignty" of the nominal leader. The second he helped to bring about himself, which was to the universal surprise of "Kucan-ites," who prefer forethought and dialectical rhetoric as a political style. Thus, he first reacted to the statements of Dr. Pucnik about disassociation with the position that this is the personal opinion of Pucnik as a citizen, and then a few days later, without referring to that same coordinating meeting in the Presidency to which Dr. Pucnik also referred, he came forth with the same thesis concerning disassociation, and he even advocated it in the broader membership of the federal Presidency before it had been verified in the republic Assembly, whose decisions Kucan incessantly refers to as the foundation of his legitimacy.

Perhaps this would have remained among the curiosities of a collector if in doing this the president had not made an irreparable mistake in making the case for the decision of the plebiscite, which he interpreted in the sense that Slovenia "is no longer associated in the SFRY" (and is disassociating itself), although even the sparrows in the trees know that it is precisely over this wording of the question in the plebiscite that there were the most disputes between DEMOS and the opposition, and that it was precisely that part that was omitted from the ballot! In other words, the inhabitants of Slovenia voted for Slovenia to become an independent state, but not that it be disassociated from the SFRY.

It is precisely because of things like this that Dr. Pucnik in a recent interview classified Kucan among the DEMOS-ites with the assertion that he had taken up the line of the ruling coalition becoming independent, and that he had said and advocated in pre-Monty Python language "something completely different." That statement and Kucan's subsequent silence—he had plenty to say on altogether more benevolent occasions—indicate most eloquently the shakiness of Kucan's authority in Yugo-diplomacy.

When Prime Minister Peterle responded from the speaker's rostrum of the Assembly that this would be a "paper" secession rather than a "real" one, i.e., that Slovenia would become independent following the scenario of his government, not the concepts of the leader of the Social Democratic Party, and when Dr. Pucnik was left only with the support of the small Liberal Party, the chroniclers who are betting on a peaceful denouement of the Yugo-drama were announcing a peaceful disentanglement of the Slovenian dilemma over the creation of a state. However, it was short-lived. The Peasant People's Party, second in the number of deputy seats within the coalition, came to the side of the Social Democrats and Liberals. The government of the Christian Democrat Peterle is reproached for being too slow in gaining independence, and the fact that they are demanding resignation of the minister for agriculture indicates the determination of the "bloc of adventurist secession" to go to the end. Peterle is not giving up the minister because on the domino theory this would cause a crisis of the government, resignations or withdrawals of other ministers, and very probably even the fall of the government. A fall of the government and withdrawal from the coalition is also being threatened by the Peasant Party.

The entanglement ought to come untangled on Monday, and until then it will continue to be uncertain whether the ratio of parties in DEMOS' coalition will still be three to three. The only thing certain is that Dr. Pucnik is ready to pull out his last ace to achieve the goal which would endow him with the halo of advocating the millennial Slovenian dream: Ready, if necessary, even to bring down the prime minister and the coalition government.

FEC Document: Problems Implementing Reform

*91BA0540A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
15 Apr 91 pp 1, 3*

[Unattributed article: "Blockade of the Constitution Suspended the Reform"]

[Text] In its communication three days ago, on Friday evening to be exact, the Federal Executive Council [FEC] made public the way it sees problems in carrying out the economic reform, but also its assessments concerning the constitutional-legal and political relations in the country. In that announcement, the Federal Executive Council

said in this connection that it had also confirmed the relevant documents sent to the Federal Assembly for examination.

BORBA is even today able to present to its readers some of those documents. The first among them is entitled "Problems in Implementing the Program of the Federal Executive Council for More Effective Functioning of the System in the Transitional Period"; it sets forth, specifically, item by item, from one sector to another, what has been done at the federal level and what the republics have done to help or to hinder the discharge of those joint obligations set forth in the Constitution.

One of the things this document says is that because of the complete blockade of enforcement of the SFRY Constitution and federal statutes, implementation of any concept of economic and social reform was practically frustrated. The SFRY Constitution has lost the character of the supreme legal enactment in the country, and this has inevitably affected realization of the vital functions of the system, unfavorably, of course.

The second document, "Basic Problems in Realizing the Economic Reform," contains an assessment of the situation in various economic areas, it points out the problems of structural changes, especially the problems of restructuring ownership, and also a final assessment of achievement of the economic reform.

The constitutional amendments in the republics, made in late 1989, during 1990, and early 1991, and also the statutes adopted on the basis of them, have basically created independent constitutional-legal systems many of whose arrangements are contrary to the respective arrangements of the SFRY Constitution to a greater or lesser degree. The autonomous legal system set up in this way contains differing arrangements on vital matters of the social system, and above all this has essentially violated the unity of the Yugoslav market, the monetary and financial systems, and also the system for financing the Federation, it has jeopardized the functioning of the system of national defense, security, and foreign policy, operation of federal agencies is blocked, and the flow of information is stopped up.

Put most succinctly, these are the introductory observations of the Federal Executive Council contained in the most recent analysis, entitled "Problems in Implementing the Program of the Federal Executive Council for More Effective Functioning of the System in the Transitional Period," which is dated 12 April.

Because of the complete blockade of application of the SFRY Constitution and federal enactments, which for all practical purposes has made it impossible to implement any concept of economic and social reforms in the entire country, proceedings are under way in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia concerning six requests for determination of whether certain provisions in republic constitutions or their constitutional laws are contrary to the SFRY Constitution. Proceedings are also being conducted to ascertain the constitutionality of all of 36

republic and provincial laws or lack of conformity with federal law, 29 other statutes and general acts which violate the rights and duties of the Federation as set forth in the SFRY Constitution.

The state of constitutional-legal relations clearly indicates, this document states, that the SFRY Constitution is losing the character of the supreme legal document in the country, and this is adversely affecting performance of the system's vital functions. These functions have been blocked, and the chaos that has ensued is causing damage, as judged by the FEC, both to the members of the Yugoslav Federation and to the Federation as a whole, and also to its international reputation.

This situation that has come about can be overcome only if during the period before a political agreement on future relations in the Yugoslav community performance of the necessary functions of the system in the transitional period is ensured. This does not prejudice future relations in the Yugoslav community, but presupposes that all assemblies will grant consent to constitutional amendments, at least enough to facilitate continuation of the reforms that have been initiated.

So that conditions might be ensured for the functioning of society in the transitional period until an agreement is reached on the future arrangement of the Yugoslav community, the Federal Executive Council has proposed a program of measures and activities for more efficient functioning of the system under the title "11 + 3." The reference is to the vital functions of society whose disruption is essentially jeopardizing the very economic and political foundations of the community.

It is particularly emphasized that the proposal containing the measures of the Federal Executive Council does not signify suspension of the arrangements laid down in the SFRY Constitution, nor any new centralization of powers at the level of the Federation. Nor does it signify either suspension or annulment of the constitutional-legal and other arrangements adopted and the processes of constructive changes in the republics which are along the line of the reforms and further democratization of social relations. Adoption of these proposals, the FEC believes, would remove numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the system. In them, the FEC is trying to provide the indispensable conditions without which it is not possible to continue further implementation of the reforms initiated either in the individual republics or at the level of the country, nor indeed conditions for reaching agreement on the country's future arrangement.

The Monetary and the Foreign Exchange System

In the FEC's assessment, the following need to be ensured: convertibility of the dinar as the sole Yugoslav currency, monetary policy and the role of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which, along with application of

other measures of economic policy, guarantees convertibility and the foreign exchange reserves which guarantee the country's external liquidity and the convertibility of the dinar.

The constitutional amendments that have been made in the republics do not jeopardize the arrangements set forth in the SFRY Constitution for the domain of the monetary and foreign exchange system. However, the FEC observes, in practice certain republics have made a breach in the monetary system, thereby violating the federal Constitution, federal laws, and the country's established monetary policy. The FEC observes that in the domain of the monetary and foreign exchange system there is basically no consistency between the constitutional arrangements of the republics and the SFRY Constitution, so that it is necessary to repair the attacks that have been made on the country's monetary system, ensure consistent respect of federal statutes in this area, and obtain consent of the republics and provinces to the proposed amendments of the law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia and uniform monetary transactions of the national banks of the republics and provinces.

Payment Transactions

The FEC has proposed "unhindered flow of payments within the country and abroad"; however, within the country payments have been practically eliminated by the unilateral, unconstitutional, and unlawful enactments and measures of the bodies in certain republics, in its judgment, and that has created utter chaos in this area. This has had the most direct impact on interruption of flows of goods, capital, and labor in the country.

The purpose of the amendments and supplements to the Law on the Social Accounting Service was to prevent gray issuing of money, to improve financial discipline and the responsibility of the banks for maintaining reserves in dinars and foreign exchange, and to abolish automatism in use of the mandatory reserves so as to ensure minimum liquidity. However, in Croatia and Serbia laws have been enacted which limit enforcement of the federal law, and in a decision of its assembly Slovenia precluded application of certain provisions toward the end of last year.

While the FEC is proposing that stability in the transitional period requires conditions guaranteeing the functioning of an integral market (for capital, manpower, and goods) that is open to the world, and legal certainty for the making of business decisions, the constitutions of the republics, and even more the legislation of the republics, contains arrangements which are contrary to the SFRY Constitution. This, states the analysis of the FEC, especially applies to the legislation of Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia, which has regulated material that is in the jurisdiction of the Federation and has been regulated in a manner contrary to federal law.

What is more, the SFRY Constitution and federal statutes have been suspended in Slovenia and Croatia.

Financing the Federation

Adoption of the FEC's views for the functioning of an integrated market open to the world presupposes repeal of all republic laws and other statutes contrary to the SFRY Constitution and federal laws, or at least their suspension. That is the manner in which temporary measures of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia staying certain enactments and acts adopted on the basis of republic statutes would be enforced.

In all the republics, statutes have been enacted and measures taken to suspend the arrangements of the SFRY Constitution and federal statutes concerning financing of the Federation. The original revenues of the Federation have been diverted to the needs of the republics, which include the obligations of the Federation to the economy. The republics have been paying less than they should have to finance the functions of the Federation.

Until a new agreement is reached, there is a need for the republics to respect the established conception for financing the Federation within the limits of the agreed expenditures, which presupposes that an agreement be reached definitively on covering the obligations that have not been discharged and the claims outstanding from 1990 in the manner proposed by the FEC.

National Defense

The document "Problems in Implementing the Program of the Federal Executive Council for More Effective Functioning of the System in the Transitional Period" has also envisaged the discharge of obligations of the Federation in the domain of national defense. The FEC is proposing amendments and supplements to the Law on Nationwide Defense and the Law on the Military Obligation, but the main reason for these amendments is the need to bring military service into conformity with the needs of replenishing the armed forces over the entire territory of the SFRY.

The FEC states in this document that in certain republics some of the relations in this area have been regulated in a manner that is not consistent with the SFRY Constitution and is contrary to federal laws in the domain of nationwide defense. This document particularly concerns itself with the example of Slovenia, where "federal statutes have been suspended, above all the Law on Nationwide Defense and the Law on the Military Obligation."

The document also engages in an analysis of the way these matters have been dealt with in Croatia, where significant changes have also been made through the republic law on nationwide defense. Certain arrangements in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which was adopted 28 September 1990, and which have to do with matters of nationwide defense, "are not in agreement with the corresponding provisions of the SFRY Constitution." The reference here is to the jurisdiction of the National Assembly of Serbia in making

decisions of peace and war and ratifying international treaties and the jurisdiction of the president of the republic to direct the armed forces in peace and war.

The Federal Executive Council is also proposing that in the transitional period the Federation's established relations should be enforced in the domain of state security because the Federation is the entity which in this area, through federal bodies and agencies, regulates the foundations of the system of the order established by the Constitution (state security). In that context, federal legislation has established and elaborated an integral system for protection of the country's constitutional order and security, clearly setting forth the rights, duties, and responsibilities of federal and republic bodies and agencies.

However, this document observes, regardless of all that, the Assembly of Slovenia has enacted a constitutional law which suspends the Federal Law on State Security and the Law on Handling Internal Affairs in the Jurisdiction of Federal Administrative Agencies. The rights, duties, and responsibilities of federal bodies and agencies have thereby been limited and effective protection of the country's constitutional order frustrated.

In view of the state of the security system in the country, the FEC, so it has been agreed, will address all the republic governments and call upon them to take appropriate steps to eliminate violations of the security system in the country.

Foreign Affairs

The Federal Executive Council is calling upon the republics to make their contribution to carrying out the foreign policy of the SFRY, to preserving the country's integrity and its vital interests in foreign policy and its international reputation. The FEC recalls the issues that have been regulated and the principles of our foreign policy and notes that in the legislation of certain republics and also in practice there have been serious departures from the constitutional and legal norms in this area, especially in the area of concluding international treaties, in that

some republics have already granted themselves jurisdiction over their conclusion and ratification.

Through its diplomatic and consular missions, the SFRY will be representing the interests of every republic and autonomous province and of all of them together, and each republic will be able, if third countries agree, to also open in them its own separate representative offices for the handling of certain matters. This document also notes that certain republics have been leaving the framework of the established foreign policy of the SFRY on the basis of statements made by their representatives.

[Box, p 3]

Unhindered Flow of Information

The FEC believes that conditions should be brought about for unhindered flow of information throughout the entire space of Yugoslavia. There has been a great deal of resistance in application of the Federal Law on the Bases of Public Information, manifested above all in the establishment of a monopoly over those media which have largely been proclaimed public enterprises with domination or simple influence of the government structure, that is, of the political party in power.

Suspension of federal statutes in this area would bring about a true media warfare in which the weapons would range from lies, forgeries, undocumented accusations, and blockades of the flow of information.

[Box, p 3]

Overruns

The violation of the established personal income policy is indicated by figures to the effect that overruns in total net personal incomes paid out in January and February of this year amount to 13.3 percent. Whereas 61.2 billion dinars were paid out, actual capabilities allowed payment of only 54.9 billion dinars. Over that period, the total volume of revenues proportionally allowed under federal law amounted to 65.9 billion dinars, but the republics and provinces collected 65.282 billion (99.1 percent). The total volume of revenues for this year should be 394.409 billion dinars.

BULGARIA

Deputy Prime Minister Meets Foreign Businessmen

AU2704190491 Sofia BTA in English 1606 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 27 (BTA)—Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, met a group of world-famous businessmen, led by Mr. Hushang Ansary. Among them is the former U.S. minister of defence Mr. Frank Carlucci, who represents the Carlyle Financial Corporation, and the president of the Westinghouse Corporation.

Mr. Tomov acquainted the businessmen with the changes in this country and with the progress of the reform. He stressed the possibilities for investments and the desire of the government to support long-term strategic projects.

The guests expressed desire for cooperation in power engineering, banking, communications and in other spheres of the economy.

Program Developed To Combat Computer Viruses

AU2604195091 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
19 Apr 91 p 1

[Report by Katya Yaneva]

[Text] Veselin Bonchev, head of the Laboratory for Computer Viruses at the Mathematical Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, has developed a package of programs for combating computer viruses. This was announced by well-informed sources at the seminar held by the Information Services Company on 18 April. Mr. Bonchev, whom specialists regard as one of the best experts on this question, is distributing his programs for free. Some of them are also translated into Russian.

The computer specialists stated that the computer viruses came about because of poor discipline. They came from computer games, which many people used to fill in their time at work.

The experts believe that the computer viruses are not a real danger to our systems. Neither Bulgaria's energy industry nor its defense is controlled totally by computers, as is the case in the United States, for example, so the consequences are not fatal, they explained. We do not have such enormous data banks, which, if damaged, could cause so much confusion.

A parliamentary source who wished to remain anonymous said that an international conference on the problems of combating computer viruses will take place in Sofia during May.

POLAND

Government Assists Needy With Housing Expenses

91EP0387B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 6 Mar 91 p II

[Article by Malgorzata Szyszlo: "Rent Assistance"]

[Text] The increase in rents, the growth of fees for central heating, hot and cold water and electricity, mean that housing expenditures are a large part of the household budget, particularly those of individuals and families with the lowest incomes. Assistance has been designated for them in accordance with the guidelines of the minister of labor and social policy, in effect from 1 March to 30 June. They can apply for this help at the public assistance centers.

Mrs. Auerlia Trzcinska, section head in the Department of Public Assistance in the Ministry of Labor, informed RZECZPOSPOLITA that the following are eligible for this assistance: renters of housing in municipal, factory, private and cooperative buildings. In addition, renters in farm production cooperative and farmers circle cooperative buildings, owners of single-family houses and apartments in private farm buildings, and subrenters registered in a given building.

Persons who leased, subleased, or gave a part or all of an occupied dwelling for use without reimbursement, are not entitled to assistance. Nor can people apply for the assistance who received unreimbursable assistance in the full amount from other sources, e.g., the factory housing fund, as well as teachers receiving a housing supplement and veterans drawing "a lump sum payment by virtue of fees paid for the use of electric, gas or thermal energy for household purposes."

"The assistance can be granted if housing expenditures," says A. Trzcinska, "exceed 10 percent of the monthly income of the family entitled to apply for monetary assistance on the basis of the provisions of the public assistance law. In addition, single persons, whose income does not exceed 150 percent of the lowest retirement pension, and whose housing expenditures absorb over 10 percent of their income. Families whose income per person does not exceed 100 percent of the lowest retirement pension and whose housing expenditures are higher than 15 percent of the income, are also not entitled to assistance. Assistance can be granted to families who maintain themselves by farming if the annual income per family member does not exceed 100 percent of the income from one conversion hectare."

The term "monthly housing expenditures" means fees by virtue of rent (with the exception of amounts due by virtue of repayments of bank credit), fees for central heating, hot and cold water, gas and electricity, used for living purposes, and the purchase of fuel. Assistance may be granted to reduce the burden of the listed expenditures for the entire dwelling if it does not have more than

two rooms. For larger dwellings, surface area norms have been established. They are, e.g., 35 m² per one person, 45 m² for three people, and 70 m for six or more people. Setting norms is supposed to prevent the granting of financial assistance from the State Treasury to persons occupying incommensurably large dwellings.

When asked how much money will be expended this year for housing assistance, Auerlia Trzcinska replied, "Approximately 1.1 trillion zlotys." When asked if this amount was sufficient she replied, "I think not. Although last year, of the 0.5 trillion zlotys allocated for housing assistance in the last six months, only slightly over 309 billion, i.e., 62 percent, was used. This happened for various reasons, including the slow flow of money to public assistance centers. In most voivodships, the unused money was added to this year's fund."

Association of Polish Banks Founded

91EP0387C Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
3-9 Mar 91 p 1

[Interview with Marian Krzak, chairman of the Association of Polish Banks and chairman of the PKO-BP [General Savings Bank-National Bank], by Jerzy Krajewski; place and date not given: "In the Banks' Interest"]

[Text] [Krajewski] Who initiated the creation of the Association of Polish Banks?

[Krzak] The idea of creating the association was in the minds of many bank presidents for a long time. We became fully aware of how necessary this was, I think, during a meeting of a group of Polish bank presidents with representatives of foreign banks in June 1990. Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz initiated this meeting. We had to think about how Western banks could help us. During the discussion it turned out that an organization representing Polish banks would be useful. The foreign visitors took up this question. The president of the National Bank of Poland at that time, Prof. Wladyslaw Baka, took advantage of this and at a meeting with bank presidents on 26 July proposed the creation of an association of Polish banks. The idea was accepted and those in attendance elected, from among themselves, an initiating group. It was composed of: Marian Kanton, president of the board of the Bydgoszcz Municipal Bank SA, Marian Rajczyk, president of the Bank of Silesia, Andrzej Szukalski, president of the Universal Economic Bank, Aleksy Misiejuk, president of the board of Agrobank SA, Ryszard Slazak, president of the board of Warsaw Western Bank SA, Zygmunt Niewiarowski, president of the board of American Bank in Poland SA, Antoni Maciejewski, president of the board of Land Bank SA, and myself, as its chairman.

[Krajewski] But the Law on Associations does not permit the creation of associations of legal entities.

[Krzak] That is why we decided to form our organization temporarily, based on the existing law dated 30 May

1989 on chambers of commerce. This law requires that an association must be created by at least 100 founding members.

[Krajewski] The charter meeting of the Association of Polish Banks lasted two days, the 24th and 25th of January. Were there any kind of controversies?

[Krzak] It was the matter of the membership in our association of foreign banks operating in Poland. It was finally agreed that they be members of the association as banks functioning in accordance with Polish law.

[Krajewski] Only 102 banks founded the association. Some did not join.

[Krzak] Indeed. Of the large banks, the Silesian Bank and the Domestic Economy Bank did not join. But I am convinced that they will soon join us.

[Krajewski] Is such an organization at all necessary? There are fears that this will be a cartel dictating terms to the banks' customers.

[Krzak] We are a self-management organization. We will not impose anything on anyone. We want to represent bank institutions to the government and to the state offices, the Central Bank, the Bank Council, in which only some banks are represented, and also in contacts with foreign bank organizations. We are not yet registered in court (we filed an application on 13 February 1991) and already an association of Italian banks has contacted us.

In addition, we want to develop a joint position on such bank matters, important to all of us, as the development of the bank sector, improvement in the efficiency of money and credit systems, bank settlements of accounts, computerization and automation of bank functions, consultation on laws pertaining to the banking system, establishing policy on interest rates and commissions, mutual assistance in staff training, and developing a code of conduct for the Polish banker. The association will arrange professional seminars, lectures, and other forms of passing information on economics and banking to the banks' management staff. We will inform the people about the rules of money management and bank operation. We are also organizing a "Banker's Club."

There was a similar organization in our country before the war. It was the Association of Banks in Poland, formed in 1920, but it grouped only private banks to coordinate the principles of cooperation between affiliated credit institutions and to represent their interests on the outside, mainly to the government.

[Krajewski] Who is on the board of the Association?

[Krzak] The Association's board has nine members. In order to ensure optimum representation, one-third of the members are from the state banks, one-third from stock company banks, and one-third from cooperative banks. My assistants are Marianna Wolska, representing the

cooperative banks, and president Romuald Meyer from BBK SA [Bydgoszcz Municipal Bank SA].

[Krajewski] In the banking sphere the talk is mainly about money, therefore it behooves me to ask where the money to finance the Association's activities comes from.

[Krzak] The charter meeting set the Association's budget for the current year at 1.5 billion zlotys, which will come from membership dues fixed in proportion to the amount of gross profit each member bank earned last year. The lowest dues are one million zlotys.

Military Industry Faces Possible Restructuring

91EP0389A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 11, 17-23 Mar 91 p 18

[Article by Ireneusz Chojnacki: "Early Warning"]

[Text] Last year's severe criticism of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], which was an element of the political battle and which resulted in a budget cut for these ministries, has indirectly impacted the arms industry. Domestic orders have declined, many capital spending projects have been postponed, and the resultant liabilities have fallen not upon the shoulders of the budget but upon individual (otherwise state) firms, thereby making their prices less competitive. The anticipated dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and announcements of the building of a professional army and of the replacement of combat equipment had also reinforced the hope that the restructuring principles of the arms industry would be defined soon and, in this way, the defense policy of the state would be clearly specified.

Meanwhile, the months pass, the political cards are shuffled again and again, and the arms industry continues to wait its turn for changes—just as the Bumar tanks are waiting for customers.

However, neither tank supplies nor the anachronistic system of financing military production presented last year by GAZETA BANKOWA and modeled after the Mesko ZM [Machinery Plants] is seemingly a sufficient argument to prove the need to treat the defense industry with proper seriousness. And so we return to the subject now, during the conflict in the Persian Gulf and as tensions occur in the USSR Baltic republics. It is, moreover, no accident that we use the example of RADWAR, producer of radar system stations for air traffic observation, a full gamut of sea navigation radar, anticollision equipment, coastal radars, radars for observation and regulation of port traffic, highway radars and, finally, automated direction and guidance systems.

Something Has To Happen

The RADWAR Scientific-Production Center for Professional Electronics had its beginning as the design office organized in 1952 at the Kasprzak Radio Plants in

Warsaw. The first independent plant began its operation two years later and the first radar station was produced in 1957.

Since that time, the self-financing firm, composed of four plants, each of which has its own complete internal clearing of accounts, a research institute and a foreign trade office, has waged a stubborn battle over its design and technological autonomy. Despite the extensive use of Soviet equipment within the Warsaw Pact framework, RADWAR, which currently employs about 5,000 people (of which 30 percent are design engineers), has preserved its autonomy, producing only one piece of equipment on a license. At the same time, it has no competition in its domestic market branch and even notes exports to the USSR on its export account. This is an extremely rare occurrence within the Warsaw Pact framework.

Last year RADWAR's production of equipment for quick-response armies, known in military terminology as armies of the first five minutes, amounted to approximately 300 billion zlotys in sales with a gross profit of 23 percent. Most of the income (about 70-80 percent) came from exports in spite of the fact that the firm sold only about 50 percent of its products abroad. If it had sold nothing abroad (it exports to more than 20 countries) the firm would be in a worse condition since it makes less on domestic sales (in which the transaction prices are lower).

However, this turn of affairs is not attributable to the often cited decline in domestic orders. In the case of RADWAR orders declined about 15-20 percent by comparison with forecasts made two to three years ago. The problem lies in the fact that although MON and MSW are purchasing the equipment they need at negotiated prices, these are essentially official prices since they are based on so-called justified costs rather than on transaction prices.

At the same time, state budgetary policy treats the firm which is producing equipment on which Poland's air defense is based like a secondary soap factory, with greater severity than any sort of joint venture company. The firm is entitled only to some relief in the form of a dividend. However, this is insignificant since the assets of the parent organ at RADWAR represent only 10 percent of the value of the total assets.

Such an approach to the problems of the armaments industry manifests doctrinaire economic thinking. According to this kind of thinking, despite the fact that RADWAR's production has continually risen (this year it plans to increase turnovers by 100 percent), despite the fact that it is competitive (its prices are from 20-30 percent lower than the prices of a similar class of equipment offered by Western firms), and despite the fact that it is independent and uses its own designs, the management of the firm does not hide its fears regarding the future of the enterprise.

Arms Stress

The effects of the criticism leveled at MON and MSW are felt in the armaments industry right up to the present. The people who work in the industry, who are subjected to the rigors associated with the specific nature of this type of production, are not proud of the fact that they work for the country's defense industry.

This, combined with their low wages (the average wage is 1.1 million zlotys), is the reason that employees leave.

The mass exodus has not yet begun. However, as unofficial reports excluding RADWAR from the body of firms designated for privatization are confirmed and in the absence of a mechanism for tying wage increases into production increases, people will begin to leave en masse. In the opinion of Marian Migdalski, chief director of RADWAR, this would be the beginning of the end of the firm and the beginning of Poland's political dependency via the import of radar equipment.

Unfortunately, such a turn of events is possible since the arms industry continues to remain on the fringe of economic life. Foreign firms have been trying to take advantage of this situation for months. They are using slogans of cooperation to attempt to gain a new selling market. Obviously, we cannot exclude out of hand agreements which are favorable to both sides. In the arms industry, however, in addition to economic consequences, we must likewise take into account political consequences. Thus, to the extent that it is possible, it would be good if we could preserve our autonomy.

Inefficiency of Rail Transport of Raw Materials

91EP0389B Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 11, 17-23 Mar 91 p 16

[Article by Bozena Zulawnik: "Carriers"]

[Text] Only memories now remain for the large Polish carriers. In 1980 they jointly transported 2.8 billion tons. The rails carried 482 million tons, and trucks carried 1.1 billion tons. In the past year there was a two-thirds drop in work as compared to 10 years ago, and a 41-percent drop compared to 1989. Meanwhile, in the past year economic organizational units engaged in transport and forwarding have increased.

The newcomers in transportation are stealing the customers. They are hauling truckloads of coal directly from Silesia, they line up in long lines awaiting authorization to cross the border. As recently as two years ago, a planned order prevailed in shipping decisions: coal [was reserved] for the PKP [Polish State Railways]; foreign trade for the PKS [State Air Transport]; building materials for Transbud; and local shipments for the cooperatives. The PSK [National Freight Forwarding Enterprise] and Hartwig had no competitors either. Customers crowded in through doors and windows. Transport enterprises rivaled each other in dreaming up problems for their customers.

It was probably the PKP that showed the most inventiveness in dreaming up problems at that time. If the unfortunate customer had only 10 tons to ship, he paid for a whole freight car and paid a fine as well. Taking too long to unload freight cars was also considered unacceptable. The PKP went after the customer's pocketbook for every failure to observe rail demands. Now the PKP has many complaints about being badly treated itself.

The Locomotive Is Out of Steam

Last year, the railroad carried 280 million tons of freight, 27.8 percent less than in 1989. Only in transit was the decline very insignificant, with its share in total transports rising from 2.56 percent to 2.8 percent. Coal is still the primary cargo (over 120 million tons). In addition to coal, the PKP transports metals (26 million tons), ores and stone (18 million tons each), and crude and processed oil products and chemical articles (8 million tons each). These are mass goods which do not require special care and modern railroad cars.

Unfortunately, our railroads continue to offer rolling stock from the steam engine era. The situation in this domain is worsening. In 1988, 2,000 new (but not at all modern) railroad cars were purchased, while last year fewer than 200 were bought. And the situation will worsen since more and more rolling stock is standing idle. At one time there were 140,000-150,000 cars on the rails while 50,000 diesel cars stood on the sidings. Now we are able to bring into service 80,000 at most but fines are still charged for delays just as they were in the good old days.

The PKP is intractable. Its rates are established by the minister of transportation and it pretends to be blameless. The PKP knows that flexibility has become a virtue and that fines should be replaced by discounts but it does not put these principles into practice because the minister does not allow it. It establishes the cost of its services depending on the distance, the volume of a shipment, the kind of goods, and the kind of railroad car needed.

At first glance what the PKP has to offer seems remarkably competitive. For example, its rates for transporting 18 tons of coal from Bytom to Skierniewice (250 km) are 64,640 zlotys per ton. The Katowice PKS asks 83,300 zlotys per ton for the identical service but it points out that the truck may be loaded on the return trip as well. Transbud in Katowice has established an hourly rate of 85,500 zlotys. If we calculate this out, it costs 76,000 zlotys to transport a ton of coal. The National Freight Forwarding Enterprise wants 100,00 zlotys per ton and it promises a discount for an order over 24 tons (the exact amount of the discount is not specified).

The PKP only appears to beat the competition in this comparison. The pitfall lies in the additional costs. The truck unloads the coal at the gate and the transport agent offers polite thanks for the order. The PKP takes additional money for substituting a rail car and for placing it at the disposal of the customer (for a total of 3,370 zlotys

per ton). The PKP's customers must pay fees and taxes for utilizing sidings and fines for keeping railroad cars overdue. They must hire a crane and the people to unload the car as well as a truck to transport the goods to their location. Thus, the costs skyrocket.

Since 1 January rail transport rates have gone up by an average of 15 percent. The customers who give the biggest orders have been treated the worst. Formerly, a system giving priority to the owners of cargoes above 25 tons was in effect. Now these customers get the same treatment as the small fry. In January shipments dropped again to a level that was 6.5 million tons below the level of last January.

Meanwhile, railroad workers' wages have risen. For all of last year they remained at a level of 92-94 percent of the domestic average. At the end of the year they declined to 85 percent of this average. In this situation there was no arguing with the work force. On 5 December 1990, an agreement was signed with the trade unions according to which one point on the wage scale is worth 4,000 zlotys. After precise calculation this figure was 3,450 zlotys. Thus the agreement was not abided by. However, January wages in the five basic economic sectors rose to 101 percent of the average (about 1.6 million). This did not make the railroad workers happy. The enterprise was taxed since the average PKP wage was less than 940,000 zlotys.

Higher wages of course mean higher costs. Last year's earnings (unsubsidized) totaled 26 billion zlotys. These were 4.2 billion zlotys below actual costs. The State Budget subsidizes deficit passenger transit, i.e., all passenger transit except for express transit and it also grants a 50-percent subsidy to the rail infrastructure. Initially it was determined that 15 billion zlotys was needed. In the end the railway received 5.5 billion: 2.7 billion in the form of a goods and services subsidy and 2.8 billion in the form of an organizational unit subsidy. Of course, railway hospitals and schools make use of the subsidy...as does everything that this inefficient state within a state has accumulated.

Central, Regional Newspaper Title Sales Noted

LD1904204591 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1053 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] The commission which is liquidating the RSW Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch publishing cooperative has officially announced that ZYCIE WARSZAWY will be sold to the Zycie Press Company for 40 billion zlotys. The Lodz daily, GLOS PORANNY, is being bought by the German firm Heinrich Bauer Verlag, the Grapak advertizing agency, as well as by journalists employed by the paper. The paper will be sold for 8.5 billion zlotys. The Krakow DZIENNIK POLSKI has already been bought by the publishing house of the employees of that paper, the Jagiellonian University, the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity economic fund, and Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy. The weekly ZYCIE PRZEMYSKIE has been sold for 150 million zlotys to the Ziemia Przemyska Company.

Sale of ZYCIE WARSZAWY Daily Discussed

AU2204103291 Warsaw PAP in English 2034 GMT
19 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 19—PAP has received an official note from the Tendering Commission which said that the ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily was sold to the Zycie Press Company for 40 billion zlotys with four votes in favour of the sale and two against.

The Zycie Press Company is formed by Societe Televisiva Italiana SRL (STEI), which cannot hold more than 49 percent of the company shares, the publishing cooperative Czytelnik, the Wielkopolski Credit Bank, Warszawa Press Ltd., Lexecom Ltd., a group of 72 ZYCIE WARSZAWY journalists, and three businessmen.

While choosing this offer the commission took into consideration that it was supported by a majority of ZYCIE WARSZAWY staff, and the most reliable institutions of Polish public life had opined that Zycie Press would guarantee the paper's independence and impartiality.

This opinion was expressed by President Lech Walesa, his Chancellery, the Presidium of the Solidarity National Commission, the secretary-general of the Democratic Union, and others.

The accepted offer was opposed by two journalist unions which, like most of the ZYCIE WARSZAWY journalists, supported the rival offer of the National Economic Chamber and the Maxwell Communication Corporation of Britain.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY is one of the biggest and popular Polish national dailies.

Overview of Drop in Consumer Consumption

91EP0388A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 10, 10-16 Mar 91 p 24

[Article by Slawomir Lipinski: "Saturation Is Always Relative: The Market in Polish"]

[Text] For several months now, Polish enterprises have been experiencing directly the reality of the sometimes forgotten formula that there is no art in producing, the art lies in selling. Everyone is crying over the barriers to demand, but almost no company brings itself to professional market analysis. In spite of the universal lament, the barrier lies not only on the demand side, but in the enterprises and trade as well.

Data from the Central Office of Statistics confirm that consumption has dropped significantly, by about one-quarter. We are eating more poorly, sales of almost all food articles have dropped, and, for this reason, the food industry noted the deepest drop in production—in comparison to a slight drop—(37 percent, 26 percent being slight). At the same time, food expenditures in worker families rose by several percentage points, to more than 50 percent, and in retirement families, even up to 60 percent. Because, at the

same time, fixed costs are rising (rents, power, etc.), the so-called disposable funds of the average Polish family have diminished drastically.

Who Suffers Most

In comparison with 1989, we are now spending about one-half as much for clothing or shoes (depending on the type of family, 7.5-11 percent of income while formerly it was 13-19 percent). Purchases of household items amount to 8-12 percent of income (formerly 10-16 percent). The purchasing power of average wages computed in December, 1990, for five basic segments of the socialized economy shows that in relation to December, 1989, more milk, cottage cheese, sugar, potatoes, coffee, vodka, black-and-white or color television sets, and tickets to the movies and the theater could be purchased now. As to all other purchases investigated, the resources of the average wallet were much less adequate. This in spite of the fact that December was the fifth month in a row in which income rose faster than prices.

Since the market industry was the first to be brought to its knees by the drop in demand, production prices in the enterprises of this group rose on the smallest scale (about one-half as fast as in industry in general). Sales profits dropped in the leather industry almost threefold (from 175 to 56 zlotys per 1,000 sales), the same thing happened with textiles, and to a somewhat lesser degree in clothing (from 214 to 118 zlotys). Despite this forced situation of restraint in raising prices, during the past year, state and cooperative enterprises producing shoes supplied the market with only 47-60 percent of the 1989 level; in the case of textiles, this index was 54-60 percent. Producers of mechanical household goods remained in a somewhat better position. Almost the same number of refrigerators and freezers were sold as in 1989, and 17 percent fewer vacuum cleaners. The weakest in this group were producers of washing machines (72 percent of the deliveries of the preceding period, and for laundromats, 57 percent). The greatest difference was experienced by producers of standard electronic equipment. Deliveries of radio receivers were two-thirds lower, tape recorders were one-third lower, while television sets were one of the few articles that appeared in the stores in greater numbers than formerly (60 percent more color television sets than before). The same is true of private cars (increase of approximately five percent) and cigarettes (nine percent).

The example of the television sets confirms that producers cannot explain all of their worries by the increase in imports of consumer goods during the past year. Estimates indicate that it reached approximately 15 percent of total deliveries to the market as against eight percent the year before. The total volume of merchandise we bought decreased by 27 percent during the past year, mostly in the first months of the stabilization program. Comparing December, 1989, with December, 1990, this drop was 12.6 percent, which expressed a certain revitalization during the second half-year. What can producers for the market count on for this year?

The Overhang Is No Longer Frightening

Every quarter, a contingent of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers prepares a prognosis for the shape of consumer demand. The most recent prognosis, covering the period to the end of March, 1991, suggests that specifically in March we may expect a revitalization of purchases in the retail market not only due to the preholiday push, but mostly due to increased wages (bonuses based on profits) and revalorization of wages in the sphere of budget and social indicators. The total money received by the people may increase by approximately 16 percent in comparison with February. This, however, does not at all translate into an equally significant rise in demand. Fixed costs will rise substantially at the same time, and the recently observed increase in the tendency to save is also significant.

At one time the terror of the Polish economy as well as an opportunity for producers of market goods was the so-called overhang of inflation. The real worth of people's savings diminished drastically in 1989, but in 1990 it increased steadily. While in January, 1990, these reserves would cover expenses for an average of 40 days, in December the average was 53 days. Of the 78 billion zlotys in savings (at the end of 1990), savings deposits made up almost 42 billion, and ready cash, 36.5 billion. While through the first nine months of the previous year the increasing savings amounts were kept in wallets, in the fourth quarter this trend was reversed (savings deposits increased by more than 38 percent, and ready cash, by only 14.5 percent). It seems that this trend will continue. Moreover, the ready cash is in the hands of an ever narrower group of consumers, and, if it finds its way to the market, it will be for the purchase of imported goods. Polish producers cannot really count on it. If the financial policy in force thus far is not changed, consumer expenditures will not increase significantly.

The Geography of Holes

For years, producers have disregarded trade, now they complain that it has crumbled. Data of the State Trade Inspectorate confirm that the barrier to demand is often accompanied by lack of various goods in the stores. Relatively speaking, trade in foodstuffs is managed best. But the complaining light industry should know that in January it was impossible to buy any men's overcoats in half the clothing stores in Lomza and Plock Voivodships. In one-third of the stores controlled by the State Trade Inspectorate in 13 voivodships, there were no size C or D men's suits. On the whole, there were greater shortages in clothing and textile stores in January than in October. Producers of black-and-white television sets describe these as a nonmoving item, meanwhile sets were available in only 40 percent of the radio-television stores and not available in any stores of this type in the Czestochowa, Olsztyn or Koszalin Voivodships (meanwhile, they were available in all the stores of the Nowy Sacz and Sieradz Voivodships. There were washing machines in half the branch stores and freezers in one-quarter of the stores, but it was difficult to buy grinders, juicers, mixers, meat grinders, and other such small appliances. Saturation of the market is therefore always relative.

Producers say that trade is always at fault, specifically wholesale trade. State wholesale trade practically never operated—as far as nonfood items are concerned—on the basis of reality. At the beginning of last year, it developed that it was not in a position to finance supplies. Profitability of trade firms dropped by more than 50 percent in comparison with the preceding period and is approximately two-thirds lower than that of industry (11 percent as compared to more than 30 percent); a positive exception is the Wholesale Food Enterprise. Half of the Voivodship Domestic Trade Enterprises reported losses for the past year. Initiatives were taken to reorganize and privatize them. According to the data of the Central Office of Statistics, as many as 40,000 registered private firms are also engaged in wholesale trade. This does not say much, however, since everyone engaged in mobile trade wants to become a wholesaler. An inventory of Polish wholesale establishments made three months ago showed that, in comparison with 1988, the area of state and cooperative stores decreased from 3.2 million to 2.6 million square meters. The difference was absorbed by new enterprises, mainly private. And this best illustrates the scale of privatization of wholesaling that has occurred thus far. A quarter of a million square meters of free space was sometimes found in stores of the old trade companies. In a real sense supplies diminished by half (they equalled 23 days of sales at the end of 1990 as against 56 days a year before). The costs of bank credits, however, amount to more than 20 percent of the total costs of trade.

Industry is attempting to take trade into its own hands, opening its own company stores, organizing mobile sales, etc. In 1989, 82 have had second thoughts on the subject merely because union activities in the all-powerful civil service threaten to get out of hand. As has been stressed by us previously, too, the civil service and the public sector compose the bulk of the educated employed in the country. This class is by its own in the sense that they have both social mobility and access to government capital. Protected as they already are by Public Service Commission rules and regulations, the clout this gives them will have been increased manifold by an assertive union movement. This clout, as government parties appear to have realized, can hardly be a monopoly of political organisations. Here lies the crux.

ROMANIA

Causes of Potential Crop Shortfall Outlined

91BA0486A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
10 Apr 91 pp 1, 5

[Article by Iosif Pop: "Anomalies That Will Be Paid For in Dollars"]

[Text] We do not want to predict a collapse of agriculture in this very year when hopes for the success of the economic reform primarily depend upon that sector of the economy. The land law is now implemented in its clear provisions, and the peasants are trying to revive their old longings and new enthusiasms in the spirit of

the law. Let us hope that the vast organizational effort the application of the law requires will favor the birth of an invigorating state of mind in the country.

Recently, however, the signals received from the villages have been increasingly disturbing and sometimes alarming. Beyond the peasants' appetite for appropriation of land, we could not overlook the essential consideration: namely, concern for the fate of this year's harvest. We do not know how and by what means the 6 million hectares awaiting spring will be cultivated. We do not even know if they will all be cultivated. But we know for certain that about 3 million hectares were planted in wheat and barley in the fall. That is good, and we would also say that for the time being we have a statistical certainty of a bread supply for one more year. But practically speaking, we are beginning to have reservations.

In any modern agriculture, bread grains are treated with the chemical fertilizers from fall to spring, substances that not only enable the plants to come up in the winter, but also lend weight to the wheat grain. Much greater yields can be obtained from those fertilizers. But that grain may become a loss when fertilizing operations are ignored or cannot be performed for more or less justified reasons. The fact is that this spring Romanian agriculture is confronted with an alarming "record." The bread grain crops are going into spring without the nourishment to make them productive, and this when 120,000 tons of chemical fertilizers for agriculture are now in the storehouses of the chemical combines, but the farmers are not getting them.

There are several reasons for this, but the problem is not easy to solve. The first reason is the inflated prices of the fertilizers, which are two or three times higher than they were before the liberalization. Another reason is uncertainty as to how agriculture is to be organized in the future. In addition to this, there is the farmers' poverty, or rather that of the agricultural cooperatives, which do not have the money even to pay for the mechanical operations performed in the fall by the mechanization sections. And last but not least, is the helplessness of the decisionmakers in agriculture in the face of these anomalies. Instead of proposing specific remedies to the government in order to get agriculture out of this very harmful impasse, the Ministry of Agriculture is rather pathetically appealing to the peasants to mobilize, to find resources and to do the actually impossible.

However stimulating the prospect of privatizing is that is offered by the law on the land reserve, someone should also take the responsibility for the operation of agriculture as a whole, if only for the simple reason that in the meantime helplessness and indifference in the use of fertilizers for the bread grain crops are very costly. According to the specialists' close calculations, agriculture will lose 2 million tons of wheat and barley by ignoring the fertilizing of the bread grains. Multiplying that amount of the world price for bread gains will show losses of several hundred million dollars.

It is a shame to leave this danger—awaiting agriculture in its first year of reform and costing hard currency—in the hands of our helplessness.

BULGARIA**Social Poll on Economic System Reported**

*AU2804194091 Sofia BTA in English 1856 GMT
28 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 28 (BTA)—Seventy-eight percent of the respondents to a sociological poll conducted by the National Center of Public Opinion Studies in April, disapprove of the idea of the emergence of economic inequality in Bulgaria with the transition to a market economy. 14 percent of the respondents approve of this idea and 8 percent expressed no opinion.

The percentages of those rejecting and accepting the possibility of mass unemployment as a result of the reform are almost the same.

Forty percent of the respondents are for stopping privatization, 33 percent want it to continue and the remaining respondents expressed no opinion.

Only 23 percent of the respondents believe that their situation will improve as a result of the reform, 24

percent believe that their situation will not change and 27 percent believe that their situation will become worse. The percentage of the extreme pessimists, who see no way out for themselves has increased considerably since the previous poll and is now 12 percent.

52 percent do not plan to work exclusively in the private sector, 30 percent are hesitating, 13 percent plan to go into the private sector and 5 percent are already working there.

Nevertheless 60 percent of the respondents believe that they are living better than their parents, 12 percent said that there was no difference and 18 percent think they are worse off than their parents.

Only 1 percent of the Bulgarians assess their financial status as good, 44 percent as normal, 38 percent as bad and 16 percent as extremely bad.

In January, on the eve of the start of the reform, 61 percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative the question whether Bulgaria's future lies in private business and the market economy.

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